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Collective Criminality and Sexual Violence: Fixing a Failed Approach

By Susana SáCouto, Leila Nadya Sadat and Patricia Viseur Sellers

I.

Introduction
Unlike domestic crimes, international crimes typically involve the efforts of many

individuals, often acting in concert.1 This poses a challenge for those tasked with trying them:
namely, how to hold individuals criminally responsible for offenses requiring collective action.2
Collective conduct produces unique harms and dynamics which make individual conduct within
the group difficult to capture and prosecute under classic theories of criminal responsibility. Firstly,
the ‘group effect’ often enhances the power of each individual to accomplish a particular criminal
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See, e.g., Prosecutor v Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgement, 15 July 1999, ¶ 190. (‘Most of the
time [international] crimes do not result from the criminal propensity of single individuals but constitute
manifestations of collective criminality: the crimes are often carried out by groups of individuals acting in pursuance
of a common criminal design.’). See generally E. van Sliedregt, Individual Criminal Responsibility in International
Law (Oxford 2012). Mark Osiel famously referred to crimes committed by the State during the Holocaust and its
aftermath as ‘administrative massacre’ due to the extensive bureaucracy needed to carry out the crimes. M.J. Osiel,
‘Ever Again: Legal Remembrance of Administrative Massacre’, 144 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 463
(1995).
1

L. Sadat & J. Jolly, ‘Seven Canons of ICC Treaty Interpretation: Making Sense of Article 25’s Rorschach Blot’, 27
Leiden Journal of International Law 755, 771 (2014). See also M. Aksenova, Complicity in International Law
(2016).
2

1

DRAFT
Final version published by CUP 11/27/19
https://doi.org/10.1017/S092215651900061X

objective. Crimes that are difficult to accomplish individually are facilitated when multiple
individuals participate.3 Secondly, the ‘group effect’ tends to augment the degenerative nature of
the criminal conduct. A false sense of impunity derived from the collective presence unleashes ‘the
worst’ in the members of the group, leading them to commit acts they would likely not have
committed when acting alone.4 Thirdly, the group dynamics, whereby many participate and yet few
are the physical perpetrators of a crime, allow individuals to plead innocence as regards a particular
offense. Participants rely upon the diffuse manner in which criminality spreads across the group –
attaching a little to everyone, but not fully to anyone, except, perhaps, the physical perpetrator.5
This diffuse sense of criminality is heightened when members of the group are geographically apart,
act at different times or perform different roles in the crime. As a result, virtually all jurisdictions,
both civil and common law, have developed at least some principles that specifically address
collective criminality.6
See e.g., C. Gibson, ‘Testing the Legitimacy of the Joint Criminal Enterprise Doctrine in the ICTY: A Comparison
of Individual Liability for Group Conduct in International and Domestic Law’, 18 Duke Journal of Comparative &
International Law 521 (2008). As the United States Supreme Court has noted, ‘concerted action both increases the
likelihood that the criminal object will be successfully attained and decreases the probability that the individuals
involved will depart from their path of criminality.’ Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961).
3

4

See generally Aksenova, supra n. 2., at 53-80; van Sliedregt, supra n. 1, at 35-37; 65-88; Iannelli v. United States,
420 U.S. 770, 778 (1975) (quoting Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961) (explaining that a
‘collective criminal agreement—[a] partnership in crime—presents a greater potential threat to the public than
individual delicts’)).
The common law labels ‘parties to the crime’ those persons who collectively participate in the commission of a
criminal offence before, during and after the offence’s commission. W. R. LaFave, Criminal Law: Fifth Edition 701
(West: 2010). See also L.N.Sadat, Commentary, Prosecutor v. Kvoćka , et al., Judgement (ICTY 2 Nov. 2001), in A.
Klip & G. Sluiter (eds.), 8 Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals 743 (Intersentia: 2005). See
generally HLA Hart & J. Gardner, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays on Philosophy of Law (Oxford, 2009).
5

6

Aksenova, supra n. 2; G. Fletcher, Basic Concepts of Criminal Law (Oxford, 1998); van Sliedregt, supra n. 1. Some
common law jurisdictions may hold participants in group-based crime responsible for a separate inchoate crime, such
as conspiracy. See, e.g., Criminal Law Act 1977, § 1.1 (England and Wales); Criminal Attempts and Conspiracy,
Order 1983, Part IV (Northern Ireland). The United States Code contains dozens of criminal conspiracy provisions,
including conspiracy to commit any other federal crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 371, and conspiracy to commit some
specific form of misconduct, ranging from civil rights violations to drug trafficking, see 18 U.S.C. § 241 (civil rights
conspiracies); 21 U.S.C. § 846 (drug trafficking conspiracies). These laws recognize the unique harms posed by
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International criminal tribunals are no different. They have developed a number of legal
theories designed to hold individuals responsible for their role in collective criminal conduct7 in
interpreting their Statutes.8 These doctrines of criminal participation, known as modes of liability,
are the subject of significant scholarly commentary.9 Yet missing from much of this debate,
particularly as regards the International Criminal Court, has been an analysis of how current
doctrine on modes of liability responds to the need to hold collective perpetrators criminally
responsible for crimes of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV).10 Indeed, many writings in

group-based criminal conduct. Although it is often asserted that the civil law systems reject common law conspiracy
doctrines, in fact article 450-1 of the French Criminal Code recognizes the notion of an association de malfaiteurs
(criminal conspiracy); Article 121-7 of the French Criminal Code also recognizes the doctrine of complicity. See
generally J. Bell, S. Byron & S. Whittaker, Principles of French Law 230 (Oxford 2d ed. 2008). See also Prosecutor
v. Ieng Sary et al., Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/SC, Co-Prosecutor’s Appeal against the Judgment of the Trial
Chamber in Case 002/01, 28 Nov. 2014 ¶50 (citing provisions on ‘individual criminal responsibility for unintended
but foreseeable crimes arising out of joint criminal enterprise’ in criminal codes of Australia, Austria, Bangladesh,
Bermuda, Botswana, Cambodia, Canada, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, India, Iraq, Israel,
Japan, Kenya, Malawi, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Poland, the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Seychelles, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda,
the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Uruguay, Western Samoa, and Zambia).
7

See, e.g., van Sliedregt, supra n. 1; H. Olásolo, The Criminal Responsibility of Senior Political and Military Leaders
as Principals to International Crimes (Hart Publishing 2009); A. Eser, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility’, in A.
Cassese et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of the Criminal Court: A Commentary (2002).
8

See, e.g., Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Art. 7, adopted on
25 May 1993 [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, Art. 6, adopted on 8
November 1994 [hereinafter ICTR Statute]. Compare Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90, adopted on 17 July 1998, entered into force 1 July 2002, Arts. 25, 28 and 30 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
See, e.g., E. van Sliedregt, ‘The Curious Case of International Criminal Liability’, 10 Journal of International
Criminal Justice 1171 (2012); J.G. Stewart, ‘The End of “Modes of Liability”’, 25 Leiden Journal of International
Law 165 (2012); J.D. Ohlin, ‘Joint Intentions to Commit International Crimes’, in F. Tanguay-Renaud & J.
Stribopoulos (eds.), Rethinking Criminal Law Theory (2011); J. D. Ohlin, ‘Three conceptual problems with the
doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise’, 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 69 (2007); A. Danner & J.
Martinez, ‘Guilty Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of
International Criminal Law’, 93 California Law Review 75 (2005).
9

10

There are some notable exceptions, but much of this commentary is limited to an analysis of the jurisprudence of
the ad hoc criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) or the Special Court for Sierra
Leone (SCSL), and predates some of the critical cases we examine here or focuses on other modes of liability like
complicity or superior responsibility. See, e.g., S. Brammertz & M. Jarvis (eds.), Prosecuting Conflict-Related
Sexual Violence at the ICTY, Ch. 7 (2016) (focusing on the practice at the ICTY); Andrés Pérez, ‘Here to Stay?
Extended Liability for Joint Criminal Enterprise as a Tool for Prosecuting Mass SGBV Crimes’, ASIL Insight Vol.
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this area of the law address perceived shortcomings in the theoretical underpinnings of modes of
liability doctrine in the abstract but ignore the application of this doctrine in concreto. As a result,
facially neutral writings on modes of liability may in fact be gendered in application, either because
they fail to account for the specific characteristics of sexual and gender-based violence or because
they are applied in a manner that requires higher thresholds for finding culpability for the
commission of SGBV crimes. This article fills the gap between theory and practice, examining
past and present doctrine, and suggesting ways in which the treatment of modes of liability by
international criminal courts and tribunals can both properly respond to the need for personal
culpability and the dangers of collective criminal activity, particularly as regards SGBV crimes.
In particular, we examine the various ways in which the ad hoc criminal tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR) and the International Criminal Court (ICC) have
held individuals liable for their role in collective criminal conduct, including joint criminal

19:13 (June 12, 2015) (analysing use of JCE III in ICTR case law); C. Eboe-Osuji, International Law and Sexual
Violence in Armed Conflicts, Ch. 2 (Martinus Nijhoff 2012) (focusing on superior responsibility); V. Oosterveld,
‘Gender and the Charles Taylor Case at the Special Court for Sierra Leone’, 19 William & Mary Journal of Women &
the Law 7 (2012) (focusing on complicity liability for SGBV crimes in case against Charles Taylor); Rebecca L
Haffajee, ‘Prosecuting Crimes of Rape and Sexual Violence at the ICTR: the Application of Joint Criminal Enterprise
Theory’, 29 Harvard Journal of Law & Gender 201 (2006) (focusing on the jurisprudence of the ICTR); P. Sellers,
‘Individual(s’) Liability for Collective Sexual Violence’, in Karen Knop (ed.), Gender and Human Rights 153 (2004)
(focusing on joint criminal enterprise in ICTY jurisprudence). While other commentators have drawn attention to
how this issue has been addressed by the International Criminal Court, much of that commentary does not examine
the application of group forms of liability to SGBV crimes in any significant detail, and also predates some of the
critical cases we examine here and/or focuses on other modes of liability or prosecutorial strategies. See, e.g.,
Thematic Prosecution of International Sex Crimes (M. Bergsmo, ed., 2018) (including several chapters that make
some reference to modes of liability but for purposes of discussing case selection and prosecutorial strategies); S.
Schwartz, ‘Wartime Sexual Violence as More than Collateral Damage: Classifying Sexual Violence as Part of a
Common Criminal Plan in International Criminal Law’, 40 University of New South Wales Law Journal 57 (2017)
(published before Bemba’s acquittal by the ICC Appeal Chamber); L. Kortfält, ‘Sexual Violence and the Relevance
of the Doctrine of Superior Responsibility in the Light of the Katanga Judgment at the International Criminal Court’,
Nordic Journal of International Law (2015) (focusing on application of superior responsibility to SGBV crimes); C.
Stahn, ‘Justice Delivered or Justice Denied?: The Legacy of the Katanga Judgment’, 12 Journal of International
Criminal Justice 809, 820-827 (2014) (raising in one paragraph – but not discussing in any significant detail – the
question of whether the standard required to convict Katanga for SGBV crimes was higher than the standard applied
to other crimes).
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enterprise liability (at the ad hoc tribunals) and direct and indirect co-perpetration and common
purpose liability (at the ICC). Thus, our general focus is on individual – as opposed to superior or
command – responsibility, although the ICC Appeals Chamber’s decision in the Bemba case11
suggests that the difficulties we identify in the Court’s application of these modes of liability also
apply to its approach to command responsibility.12
As Part II describes, the ad hoc international criminal tribunals used a theory of liability,
known as joint criminal enterprise (JCE), to prosecute perpetrators who joined together to
implement a common criminal objective. First developed in Prosecutor v. Tadić,13 the Tadić
Appeals Chamber identified three forms of JCE under customary international law, the first two of
which, known as JCE I and II, were relatively uncontroversial. An extended form of JCE known
as JCE III – described more fully in the next section – was used to successfully convict perpetrators
of SGBV crimes, but is contentious, especially in regard to its mens rea, which allows liability to
attach if the perpetrator assumes the risk that foreseeable crimes will occur.
The Rome Statute, negotiated in 1998, has much longer and complex provisions on criminal
responsibility (and modes of liability) than prior instruments. Article 25 of the Statute addresses
individual criminal responsibility generally whereas Article 28 addresses command responsibility.
As Part III explains, the ICC’s judiciary have taken international criminal law in a new direction;
applying Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute, they developed a more rigid approach to modes of

11

Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08 A, Judgement on the appeal of Mr JeanPierre Bemba Gombo against Trial Chamber III’s ‘Judgment pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute’, June 8, 2018.
12

For a gender analysis of the Bemba case, see S. SáCouto & P. Sellers, ‘The Bemba Appeals Chamber Judgment:
Impunity for Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes?,’ 27 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 599 (2019),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3391421.
13

Tadić Appeals Judgment, supra n. 1.
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liability law, engaging in judicial interpretation no less astonishing than the development of the JCE
theory of liability by the ad hoc tribunals. The ICC’s new interpretations have resulted in acquittals
of sexual violence counts in every case presented to the Court, except in the recent Prosecutor v.
Bosco Ntaganda case.14
Our study reveals two divergent patterns emerging from the jurisprudence of the ad hoc
tribunals and the ICC, each of which presents challenges for the successful prosecution of SGBV
crimes. First, the ad hoc international criminal tribunals’ prosecution of SGBV crimes under the
doctrine of JCE III proved successful when evidence of these crimes was examined in a
“contextually comparative” manner to evidence of other atrocity crimes. However, this mode of
liability was subject to both judicial dissent and scholarly critique. Second, at the ICC, new modes
of liability were developed (perhaps as a response to critiques of JCE). Known as direct and indirect
co-perpetration – and common purpose liability – these have largely been interpreted restrictively
and/or applied differently to acts of sexual violence than to other crimes, leading to acquittals of
the accused on the sexual violence counts.

14

Prosecutor v. Bosco Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Judgment, Trial Chamber VI, 8 July 2019. The Trial
Chamber convicted Bosco Ntaganda of rape and sexual slavery as an indirect co-perpetrator pursuant to Article
25(3)(a) of the Rome Statute. Ibid. However, the judgment is subject to appeal and it is unclear whether the Appeals
Chamber, if seized of the case, will affirm the Trial Chamber’s approach. Moreover, the difficulties we identify in the
Court’s approach to attributing liability for sexual violence crimes are recurrent and extend beyond Article 25(3) to
the Court’s interpretation of command responsibility under Article 28. Indeed, while a unanimous Trial Chamber
originally convicted Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo of SGBV crimes under command responsibility, see Prosecutor v.
Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-3343, Judgment pursuant to Art. 74 of the Statute, Trial
Chamber III, 21 March 2016, ¶ 752, the Appeals Chamber reversed his conviction on June 8, 2018, see Bemba
Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra n.11. Thus, the ICC has yet to see a successful conviction through appeal for
SGBV crimes. See also SáCouto & P. Sellers, ‘The Bemba Appeals Chamber Judgment’, supra n.12.

6
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The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals set precedents for SGBV prosecutions,15 as did
subsequent World War II proceedings in Europe and Asia.16

Nevertheless, much of this

jurisprudence was ignored and victims of SGBV committed during periods of conflict or repression
were rendered largely invisible in the decades after the war.17 Modern international criminal law,
thankfully, has increasingly recognized the need to prosecute SGBV crimes for all the same reasons
other atrocity crimes are punished: to deter perpetrators, address specific harms, render justice to
the victims, and express official condemnation of the behaviour.18 Yet there remains a long way to
go, even at the ICC, where emphasis on highly technical and scientific explanations of the ICC’s
modes of liability provisions have tended to side-line SGBV crimes as mere ‘incidents’ of conflict.19

See, K. D. Askin, ‘Prosecuting Wartime Rape and Other Gender-Related Crimes under International Law:
Extraordinary Advances, Enduring Obstacles’, 21 Berkeley J. Int'l Law 288 (2003), at 302 [hereinafter ‘Askin,
Prosecuting Wartime Rape’]; K.D. Askin, War Crimes Against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes
Tribunals, 42-44 (1999); K.D. Askin, ‘Treatment of Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict: A Historical Perspective and
the Way Forward’, in A. de Brouwer, C. Ku, R. Romkens & L. van den Herik (eds), Sexual Violence as an
International Crime: Interdisciplinary Approaches, (Intersentia 2013); P. Sellers, ‘The Context of Sexual Violence:
Sexual Violence as Violations of International Humanitarian Law’, in Substantive and Procedural Aspects of
International Criminal Law, McDonald & Swaak Goldman (eds.), 263, 274 (2000). Notwithstanding these
developments, the Tokyo Tribunal did not prosecute the sexual enslavement of females compelled into the ‘comfort’
system. See, P. Sellers, ‘Wartime Female Slavery: Enslavement?,’, 44 Cornell University Journal of International
Law 115-142 (2011), http://128.253.118.14/research/ILJ/upload/Sellers-final-4.pdf.
15

16

See Dan Plesch, Susana SáCouto, & Chante Lasco,‘The Relevance of the United Nations War Crimes Commission
to the Prosecution of Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes Today’, 25 Criminal Law Forum 349–381 (2014).
17

See, e.g. A.-M. de Brouwer, Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: The ICC and the Practice of
the ICTY and ICTR 4-9 (Intersentia 2005); Rape as a Weapon of War: Accountability for Sexual Violence in Conflict,
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008)
(statement of Dr. Kelley Dawn Askin, Senior Legal Officer, Open Society Justice Initiative) (“I was shocked that as
we approached the end of the 20th century, there was still confusion about whether international law prohibited
wartime sexual violence. There was widespread acknowledgment that atrocities such as massacres, torture, and slave
labour were prosecutable, but there was scepticism, even by legal scholars and military officials, as to whether rape
was sufficiently serious to be prosecutable in an international tribunal set up to redress the worst crimes.”); C.
Steains, ‘Gender Issues’, in R. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court: The Making of the Rome Statute 357,
358 (1999).
18

See, e.g., Askin, ‘Prosecuting Wartime Rape,’ supra n. 15.

19

See infra Parts II & III.
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Violence against females and males, whether in detention or during or following attacks, is
a pervasive 21st century phenomenon. Examples abound: sexual violence committed against
prisoners held by the United States at Abu Ghraib following the invasion of Iraq in 2003;20 rape as
a tool of ethnic cleansing in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; 21 mass rapes against females
in the Central African Republic;22 sexual slavery practiced by members of the Islamic State against
the Yazidis (and others);23 and sexual violence against male and females detainees in Syrian
prisons.24 These SGBV crimes are both ‘social and systemic’ expressions of domination and power
in conflicts where the vulnerable are specifically targeted for violence by those who believe
themselves to be beyond the reach of the law, or, worse, within the bounds of conduct tolerated by
the law.25 Indeed, to the extent the law has failed to sanction this violence when directed against
females, or even to recognize how it manifests against males, one wonders whether this is not yet
again a way in which international law remains a ‘thoroughly gendered system’.26

L.N. Sadat, ‘International Legal Issues Surrounding the Mistreatment of Iraqi Detainees by American Forces’, 8
Insights (American Society of International Law) (May 21, 2004), available at
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/8/issue/10/international-legal-issues-surrounding-mistreatment-iraqi-detainees.
20

A. Peterman, T. Palermo & C. Bredenkamp, ‘Estimates and Determinants of Sexual Violence Against Women in
the Democratic Republic of Congo’, American Journal of Public Health (June 2011), available at
https://ajph.aphapublications.org/doi/abs/10.2105/AJPH.2010.300070;
21

‘“They Said We Are Their Slaves”: Sexual Violence by Armed Groups in the Central African Republic’, Human
Rights Watch (5 October 2017), available at https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/10/05/they-said-we-are-theirslaves/sexual-violence-armed-groups-central-african.
22

‘Iraq: ISIS Escapees Describe Systematic Rape’, Human Rights Watch (14 April 2015), available at
https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/04/14/iraq-isis-escapees-describe-systematic-rape.
23

‘I lost my dignity’: Sexual and gender-based violence in the Syrian Arab Republic: Conference room paper of the
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, A/HRC/37/CRP.3, 8 March 2018,
available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/CoISyria/A-HRC-37-CRP-3.pdf
24

See, e.g., K. Crenshaw, 43 ‘Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women
of Color’, Stanford Law Review 1241 (1993).
25

H. Charlesworth, C. Chinkin & S. Wright, ‘Feminist Approaches of International Law’, 85 American Journal of
International Law 613, 615 (1991).
26
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In light of these findings, this Article makes two specific recommendations. First, national
and international criminal courts and tribunals applying and developing modes of liability
jurisprudence under customary international law should accept the customary basis of JCE III and
the jurisprudential precedents of the ICTY and ICTR, as well as of other courts that have examined
this issue more recently, in particular the Extraordinary African Chambers. Second, the ICC should
revisit its restrictive approach to Article 25(3)(a), and interpret it consistent with a plain reading of
that provision, while addressing what appears to be a discriminatory application of common plan
liability in Article 25(3)(d) by more appropriately situating sexual and gender based violence within
the context of other crimes. While the recent Trial Chamber decision in Ntaganda goes some way
toward properly contextualizing sexual violence within other criminal conduct and interpreting
Article 25(3)(a) more broadly, the case is still subject to appeal and it is not yet clear that the
decision has ushered in a new normative approach to sexual violence crimes at the ICC. Absent a
shift in that direction, cases of conflict-based sexual and gender sexual violence may continue to
suffer significant obstacles, threatening to render such violence as invisible as it was just decades
ago,27 in spite of provisions in the Rome Statute specifically designed to prevent this result.

II.

JCE Liability for SGBV Crimes: Successful Cases, but the Doctrine is Criticized

A. JCE as a Mode of Liability
JCE liability originates in Article 7(1) of the ICTY Statute.28 In the ICTY’s first case,

27

See supra n. 17 and accompanying text.

ICTY Statute, supra n.8, art. 7(1) (providing that a person who ‘planned, instigated, ordered, committed or
otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation of execution of a crime . . . shall be individually responsible
for the crime.’).
28

9
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Prosecutor v. Tadić, the Appeals Chamber held that JCE is a form of ‘commission’ that captures
instances in which perpetrators implement a common criminal objective29 to commit an
international crime.30 As the late Antonio Cassese, a member of the Tadić Appeals bench,
explained:
[JCE] is crucial more in international criminal law than at the domestic level. In the
world community international crimes such as war crimes, crimes against humanity,
genocide, torture and terrorism share a common feature: they tend to be expression of
collective criminality, in that they are perpetrated by groups of individuals, military
details, paramilitary units or government officials acting in unison or in pursuance of a
policy. When such crimes are committed, it is extremely difficult to pinpoint the specific
contribution made by each individual participant in the collective criminal enterprise.31
Indeed, individual liability may be difficult to assign when crimes are the product of collective
criminality, as certain individuals physically perpetrate the crime while others contribute to its
commission in other ways, such as through planning or preparation.32 JCE liability recognizes that
all participants may be equally culpable.33 As the Appeals Chamber in Tadić explained:
Although only some members of the group may physically perpetrate the criminal act
(murder, extermination, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, etc.), the
participation and contribution of the other members of the group is often vital in
facilitating the commission of the offence in question. It follows that the moral gravity
of such participation is often no less – or indeed no different – from that of those actually
Tadić, supra n.1, ¶190. The Appeals Chamber interchangeably uses the terms ‘common design’, ‘common
purpose’ and ‘joint criminal enterprise’.
29

30

Ibid. ¶¶ 190-92 (citing, inter alia, United Nations, Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (May 3, 1993)).
A. Cassese, ‘The Proper Limits of Individual Responsibility under the Doctrine of Joint Criminal Enterprise’, 5
Journal International of Criminal Justice 109 (2007).
31

32

Tadić, supra n. 1, ¶ 191.

33

Ibid. ¶¶ 191-92; Prosecutor v. Karemera et al., Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Trial Chamber Decision on the
Preliminary Motions by the Defence of Joseph Nzirorera, Édouard Karemera, André Rwamakuba and Mathieu
Ngirumpatse Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Joint Criminal Enterprise, 11, May 2004, ¶ 36,
https://www.legal-tools.org/uploads/tx_ltpdb/KaremeraetalICTRTCDecisiononthePreliminaryMotionsbytheDefence_11-05-2004__E__05.html.
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carrying out the acts in question.34
The Tadić Appeals Chamber reasoned that limiting liability to the physical perpetrator would
disregard the role of co-perpetrators who enabled the physical perpetrator to carry out the criminal
act.35 The Chamber considered such liability distinct from aiding and abetting, which, depending
on the circumstances, might understate the degree of the co-perpetrators’ criminal responsibility.36
Given the often unorganized, chaotic and decentralized nature of the Yugoslav conflict,37 JCE
liability was an effective way for the ICTY to capture the collective criminality committed during
the conflict.
Although concerns arose about the Tribunal’s methodology in “gap-filling” outside the
express terms of the Statute,38 there was precedent for the Tribunal’s approach. Historically,
organizational liability was recognized in post-World War II cases,39 and forms of liability for

Tadić, supra n. 1, at ¶ 191. See also Prosecutor v. Ieng Sary et al., Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ
(PTC35), ECCC Decision on Appeals Against the Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint Criminal Enterprise, May
20, 2010 [hereinafter ECCC PTC JCE Decision], ¶ 55.
34

35

Tadić, supra n. 1, at ¶ 192.

36

Ibid.

37

Annexes to the Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established pursuant to Security Council Resolution
780 (1992), U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1994/674/Add.2 ¶ 22, 31 (1994) (noting that the Yugoslav conflict
‘was characterized by a multiplicity of combatant forces . . . sometimes operating under no established command and
control’.).
38

Sadat & Jolly, supra n. 2 at 758. The gap filling was needed as the Statute was silent regarding any form of common
plan liability, a seemingly clear omission (and flaw) in the drafting.
39

See Tadić, supra n. 1, ¶¶ 195-228 (canvassing national legislation and post-WWII cases).
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participation in group crimes, such as complicity, conspiracy,40 ‘common plan’ liability;41 and
common purpose liability,42 were found in other international instruments.
The ad hoc tribunals interpreted JCE liability as consisting of: a plurality of persons;43 the
existence of a common plan, which amounts to or involves the commission of a crime provided for
in the Statute;44 and participation of the accused in the execution of the common plan.45 The ICTY
recognized three categories of JCE, commonly referred to as JCE I,46 JCE II47 and JCE III,48 which

40

See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted 9 Dec. 1948, entered into
force 12 Jan. 1951; art. III, 78 U.N.T.S. (“The following acts shall be punishable… (b) conspiracy to commit
genocide).
41

See Draft Codes of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, adopted by the International Law
Commission, reprinted in Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 43rd session, 29 April-19
July 1991, Ch. 2, art. 3(2), U.N. Doc A/46/10, 1991, [hereinafter 1991 Draft Code of Crimes]; Draft Codes of Crimes
against the Peace and Security of Mankind, adopted by the International Law Commission, reprinted in Report of the
International Law Commission on the work of its 48th session, 6 May – 26 July 1996, art. 2, U.N. Doc A/51/10, 1996
[hereinafter 1996 Draft Code of Crimes]. The ‘common plan’ language was used in the commentary to these articles
of both the 1991 and 1996 draft codes. See 1991 Draft Code of Crimes, Ch. 2, art. 3(2), comment 4; 1996 Draft Code
of Crimes, art. 2, comment 15.
42

International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, art. 2(3), U.N. GAOR, 52 nd Sess., Annex,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/164 (1998) [hereinafter Terrorist Bombing Convention].
43

Tadić, supra n. 1, ¶ 227.

The plan need not have been previously arranged or formulated, but may ‘materialise extemporaneously and be
inferred from the fact that a plurality of persons acts in unison to put into effect a joint criminal enterprise.’ Tadić,
supra n. 1, ¶ 227.
44

The Appeals Chamber noted in Tadić that the participation may either take the form of committing a specific
crime under the Statute, or, importantly in this case, “may take the form of assistance in, or contribution to, the
execution of the common plan or purpose.” Tadić, supra n. 1, ¶ 227.
45

46

JCE I exists when all participants enter into a common plan, share the intent to commit a crime, and one or more
actually perpetrates the crime. Tadić, supra n.1, ¶¶ 227-8.
47

JCE II exists when an organized system of ill-treatment occurs, and the accused is aware of the nature of the
system, intends to further the system of ill-treatment and in some way actively participates in enforcing the system.
Tadić, supra n.1, ¶ 228; see also Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No. IT-00-39-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 17
March 2009.
48

JCE III requires the participation of an accused in either a basic JCE I or in a systemic JCE II scenario, and
recognizes criminal liability for crimes outside the original criminal plan or system of ill-treatment that were the
natural and foreseeable consequence of that plan or system, if the accused willingly assumed the risk they would
occur. Tadić, supra n. 1, ¶ 228.
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were differentiated by their circumstances and their required mens rea. JCE I’s design or common
purpose may take multiple forms, such as a campaign of terror, as long as the participants share the
intent to commit the crime.49 JCE II circumstances often manifest as a system of ill-treatment, such
as a concentration camp or police detention centre.50 This form of JCE requires personal knowledge
of the system and an intent to further it,51 which may be proved directly or indirectly as a matter of
inference from an accused’s position, tasks or authority within the system.52 JCE III’s mens rea
focuses on the foreseeability of a criminal act and the willingness of the accused to assume the risk
that it will occur.53
Important JCE III cases have resulted in convictions for SGBV crimes, especially for nonphysical perpetrators. The use of JCE III to hold SGBV perpetrators accountable challenged the
misconception that sexual violence committed in the context of conflict or mass violence was often
isolated, unrelated to the other crimes, or the unfortunate acts of lone corrupt soldiers.54 JCE III

49

Ibid.

50

Ibid.

51

Ibid. See also Prosecutor v. Miroslav Kvočka et al., ICTY, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, 28, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
February 2005, ¶ 208.
52

Tadić, supra n. 1, ¶¶ 220, 228.

53

Ibid.

54

See e.g., C. Eboe-Osuji, Rape and superior responsibility: International criminal law in need of adjustment,
International Criminal Court Guest Lecture Series of the Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court
(2005) 6 (‘the theory of individualistic opportunism proceeds ... from the ... premise that rape is a crime of
opportunity which, during conflict, is frequently committed by arms-bearing men, indulging their libidos, under cover
of the chaotic circumstances of armed conflict’); Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape, supra n. 15, at 296-97 (‘When
customary law began prohibiting rape crimes,… sexual violence did not tend to be officially encouraged, but the
crimes were largely ignored or tolerated by commanders, many of whom believed sexual violence before a battle
increased the soldiers’ aggression or power cravings and that rape after a battle was a well-deserved reward, a chance
to release tensions and relax. As rape became explicitly prohibited, the crimes were still deemed mere inevitable
consequences or side effects of armed conflict and were rarely punished. Efforts to enforce the prohibitions against
rape generated little interest, as most considered sexual violence incidental by products of the conflict.’); Sellers &
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liability furthered a contextualization of crimes that required a non-discriminatory approach to the
assessment of evidence of SGBV crimes. Essentially, to establish JCE III crimes as the natural and
foreseeable consequence of intended crimes in the JCE I common plan or in the JCE II system of
ill-treatment, such crimes had to form part of the context of the initially atrocity-propelled conduct.
Thus, evidence of SGBV crimes had to be appraised together with other concurrent criminal
conduct rather than be viewed as an abnormality.

B. Comparatively Contextualizing SGBV Crimes: The Krstić case
While rarely noted,55 an early JCE III case, based in part on SGBV crimes, was the case of
Prosecutor v. Krstić. 56 Radislav Krstić was charged with genocide for the Srebrenica slaughter as
well as other killings and sexual violence as persecution.57 These other crimes occurred just prior
to the Srebrenica genocide, in pursuit of a JCE comprised of forcibly displacing Bosnian Muslims
into the UN compound in Potočari, creating a ‘humanitarian crisis’.58 In finding Krstić liable under
JCE III for rapes committed in the UN compound, the Trial Chamber focused on Krstić’s awareness
of the ‘catastrophic humanitarian situation’.59 It noted ‘the lack of shelter, the density of the crowds,

Okuizumi, supra n.10, at 61-62 (noting that ‘[s]exual assaults committed during armed conflict are often rationalized
as the result of a perpetrator’s lust, libidinal needs, or stress’). See also S. Brownmiller, Against Our Will: Men,
Women and Rape (Ballantine Books 1975).
55

Cf., Cassese, supra n. 31.

56

Prosecutor v Krstić, Case No IT‑98‑33‑T, Trial Chamber Judgement, 2 August 2001.

57

Ibid., ¶¶ 150-154.

58

Ibid., ¶¶ 38-40.

59

Ibid. ¶ 155.
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the vulnerable condition of the refugees, the presence of many regular and irregular military and
paramilitary units in the area and the sheer lack of sufficient UN soldiers to provide protection’.60
The crisis environment made it foreseeable to Krstić that other crimes, such as killings and rapes,
might occur.61 Emphasis was placed on contextualizing the sexual violence not only within the
intended JCE I crimes, but also within the foreseeability of the other JCE III crimes of killings.
Such non-discriminatory assessment concerning the foreseeability of SGBV crimes became a
determinant factor in ICTY62 and ICTR63 cases using JCE III.

C. Šainović and the Foreseeability Standard: Possibility or Probability?
Prosecutor vs. Šainović64 clarified the mens rea standard of foreseeability, namely whether
there needed to be a possibility or probability that further crimes would occur, given the JCE I or

60

Ibid. ¶ 616.

Ibid. Similarly, the Krstić Appeals Chamber, responded to the Defence’s ground of appeal on conviction of the
‘other’ crimes by opining that, “[G]iven Kristić’s role in causing the humanitarian crisis in Potočari, the issuance of
orders directing that civilians not be harmed is not sufficient to establish that the crimes which occurred were not a
natural and foreseeable consequence of the (JCEI) plan to forcibly transfer civilians”. Prosecutor v. Krstić, Case No.
IT-98-33-A, Appeal Chamber Judgement, 19 April 2004, ¶ 149.
61

62

See, e.g., Prosecutor v Šainović et al., Case No. IT‑05‑87‑A, Appeals Chamber Judgement, 23 January 2014, ¶¶

1550‑1592; Prosecutor v Đorđević, Case No IT‑05‑87/1‑A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 27 January 2014, ¶¶ 904‑
929. For another example of contextualization of SGBV crimes, but in the context of a JCE II case, see Prosecutor v.
Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Trial Chamber Judgement, 2 November 2001. There, five accused were
convicted of SGBV crimes due in part to a recognition that the environment in which the violence occurred rendered
the SGBV crimes intended, if not foreseeable. As the Chamber explained: ‘[a]pproximately 36 women were held in
detention, guarded by men with weapons who were often drunk, violent and physically and mentally abusive and who
were allowed to act with virtual impunity. Indeed it would be unrealistic and contrary to all rational logic to expect
that none of the women held in Omarska, placed in circumstances rendering them especially vulnerable, would be
subjected to rape or other forms of sexual violence. This is particularly true in light of the clear intent of the [JCE II]
criminal enterprise to subject the target group to persecution through such means as violence and humiliation’. Ibid.,
¶ 327.
63

See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No.ICTR-98-44-A, Appeals Judgement, 28 September 2014.

Prosecutor v. Sainović et al., Case No. IT-05-87-T Judgement, 26 February 2009 [hereinafter Šainović et al. Trial
Judgement].
64
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JCE II context. Šainović concerned a JCE I common plan to forcibly displace the Kosovo Albanian
population through a persecutory campaign of terror65 in which sexual assaults had occurred.66 At
trial, Nikola Šainović and his co-accused, Sreten Lukić, were acquitted of rapes charged as
persecution because the acts were not considered foreseeable as required for JCE III liability67 and
the Prosecution failed to prove their knowledge of the specific sexual assaults charged.68 On appeal,
the Prosecution argued that the Trial Chamber had confounded the possibility standard of the JCE
foreseeability requirement with a probability standard. The Appeals Chamber agreed,
characterizing the forcible displacement of the Kosovo Albanian population as an ‘environment of
ethnic animosity’ where ‘aggression and violence prevailed’.69 It recognized the accused’s
awareness of these circumstances,70 and their knowledge of sexual assaults committed during the
expulsions, even though these were not the same sexual assaults charged against the accused.71
Given these conditions, the Appeals Chambers held that the rapes were clearly foreseeable and
found the accused liable under JCE III for those rapes.72 Significantly, it recognized that as members
of a JCE I, the accused had a privileged position that permitted them to detect possible crimes

65

Ibid.

66

Ibid., vol. 3, ¶¶472, 1135; vol. 2 ¶¶ 622, 688, 874, 1187, 1224.

Ibid. The Trial Chamber convicted another co-accused, Nebojša Pavković, of persecutions through sexual assaults
under JCE III, ibid., vol. 3, ¶¶ 785, 788, which was later upheld on appeal. Šainović et al. Appeals Judgement, supra
n. 62, ¶ 1602.
67

68

Šainović et al. Trial Judgment, supra n. 64, vol. 3, ¶¶ 469, 472, 1133, 1135.

69

Ibid. ¶ 1591.

70

Ibid. ¶¶ 1581-82, 1591-92, 1602.

71

Ibid.

72

Šainović et al. Appeals Judgement, supra n. 62, ¶¶ 1582, 1592, 1602.
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triggered by the original common plan. Subsequent appellate jurisprudence affirmed the JCE III
mens rea standard. As the Karadžić interlocutory appeal held:
[Foreseeability] is not satisfied by implausibly remote scenarios. Plotted on a spectrum of
likelihood, the JCE III mens rea standard does not require an understanding that a
deviatory crime would probably be committed; it does, however, require that [whether] a
crime could be committed is sufficiently substantial as to be foreseeable to an accused.73

D. Đorđević and Karemera: JCE III Liability for SGBV Crimes of Specific Intent
Whether JCE III liability should apply to specific intent crimes, such as persecution and
genocide, has been among the doctrinal issues critiqued by some, including Judge Antonio
Cassese.74 In Đorđević,75 the Appeals Chamber assessed the contentious issue of whether JCE
III liability could be extended to persecutory acts. Vlastimir Đorđević was charged with
participating in a JCE I that aimed to change the ethnic balance of Kosovo to ensure Serbian
dominance in the territory76 and was convicted of over 700 murders and countless episodes of
forced transfer and persecutory acts. He was acquitted of rapes alleged under JCE III liability77
because the Trial Chamber was not convinced that the SGBV satisfied the discriminatory intent

Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Appeals Decision on the Third Category of Joint Criminal
Enterprise Foreseeability, 25 June 2009, ¶ 18 [hereinafter Karadžić JCE Appeals Decision].
73

As Cassese noted, ‘(r)esorting to JCE III would be intrinsically ill-founded when the crime committed requires a
“special” or specific intent. It would thus be in appropriate to apply the extended form of JCE to charges, for example
of genocide, persecution or aggression.’ Cassese, A., Gaeta P., Baig, L., Fan, M., Gosnell, C. and Whiting, A, eds..
Cassese's International Criminal Law, Ch. 9, 172 (2013). Yet, neither Cassese nor other commentators raised
objections to Krstić’s conviction for persecution, a specific intent crime that consisted of SGBV acts. See discussion
of Krstić case at supra Section II. B.
74

75

Đorđević Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra n. 62.

Prosecutor v. Đorđević, Case No. IT-05-87/1-T, Trial Judgment, 23 February 2011 [hereinafter Đorđević Trial
Chamber Judgement].
76

77

Ibid. ¶ 2230.
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requirement of persecution.78 On appeal,79 the Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber
committed a legal error when it ‘failed to evaluate the surrounding circumstances of Witness
K20’s and Witness K14’s sexual assaults and the broader context in which these crimes
occurred’.80 It meticulously reviewed the specific and contextual circumstances of the five sexual
assaults charged as persecution under JCE III. After examining elements such as the ethnicity of
the victims and the perpetrators, the status or authority of the perpetrators, the concurrent
criminality inflicted on the females and other victims, the verbal abuse, and the location and
timing of the physical assaults, the Chamber concluded that the sexual assaults satisfied the
discriminatory nature of persecution.81 It then held that Đorđević had significantly contributed to
the JCE I82 and reiterated that JCE III foreseeability entailed the possibility that the rapes would
occur.83 It found the atmosphere of violence and fear84 had left the population ‘highly
vulnerable’,85 particularly given the separation of the community along gender lines, whereby

78

Ibid. ¶¶ 1793-97.

The prosecution appealed the acquittal of the rapes as persecutory acts. Đorđević countered that the rapes were not
foreseeable and that no evidence pointed to him being “aware of the possibility that these crimes would occur.”
Đorđević Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra n.62, ¶ 917.
79

80

Ibid.

81

Ibid., ¶ 897.

82

Ibid. ¶ 902.

Đorđević Appeals Chamber Judgement, supra n.62, ¶ 907. The Appeals Chamber quoted appellate jurisprudence
noting that foreseeability ‘“is not satisfied by implausibly remote scenarios. Plotted on a spectrum of likelihood, the
JCE III mens rea standard does not require an understanding that a deviatory crime would probably be committed; it
does, however, require that a crime could be committed is sufficiently substantial as to be foreseeable to an
accused.’” Ibid. (quoting Karadžić JCE Appeals Decision, supra n. 73).
83

84

Ibid. ¶ 921.

85

Ibid.
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Serbian forces could act ‘with near impunity’.86 It recalled Đorđević’s personal knowledge that
Serbian forces reportedly committed crimes during the previous year’s military offensive 87 and
his knowledge about the dire humanitarian situation through media sources.88 It, therefore,
concluded that Đorđević ‘willingly took the risk when he participated in the JCE’89 and that given
the discriminatory nature of the Kosovo campaign, ‘it was foreseeable to Đorđević that such
sexual assaults might be carried out with discriminatory intent.’90 The Đorđević Appeals
Chamber’s contextual examination of the JCE III crimes in relation to the common plan, and its
contextual analysis of the infliction of sexual violence – including its discriminatory intent –
evinces a non-discriminatory and gender-competent approach to JCE III. Krstić as well as
Šainović resonate in Đorđević.
The ICTR case of Karemera et al. reviewed whether JCE III liability could apply to the
specific intent crime of genocide.91 Two accused were convicted, inter alia, of genocide and crimes
against humanity.92 Their liability stemmed from their participation in a JCE I to destroy the
Tutsis.93 Their liability for sexual violence94 as acts of genocide and as crimes against humanity

86

87

Đorđević Appeals Chamber Judgement, supra n.62, at ¶ 922.
Ibid., ¶ 924.

88

Ibid. ¶ 925.

89

Ibid. ¶ 926.

90

Ibid.

92

Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Trial Judgement, 2 February 2012 [hereinafter Karemera Trial
Judgement].
93

Ibid. ¶ 1649-54.

94

The Prosecutor charged the accused for all rapes and sexual assaults that occurred in Rwanda from early to mid-April
1994 to June 1994 as genocide. The Trial Chamber, however, found Karemera and Ngirumpatse responsible only for
the rapes and sexual assaults committed by the Kigali and Gisenyi Interahamwe during the genocide. Ibid. ¶¶ 1671,
1683. However, this limited sexual assault crime-base did not apply to their JCE III liability, which did not depend on
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was established via JCE III for rapes committed by the Interahamwe militia95 that were a natural
and foreseeable consequence of the JCE I common plan ‘to exterminate Tutsis in Rwanda’.96 The
accused appealed.97 After reiterating the possibility standard for JCE III liability set forth in the
Karadžić interlocutory JCE decision,98 the Appeals Chamber affirmed the Trial Chamber’s analysis
that the rapes had been foreseeable to the accused.99 Furthermore, it rejected the accused argument
that the Interahamwe did not possess a genocidal intent when committing the rapes and sexual
assault,100 explaining:
Bearing in mind that these rapes and sexual assaults were intricately linked to the
killing of members of the Tutsi group and intended to inflict further suffering, the
Appeals Chamber finds that the Trial Chamber adequately explained and reasonably
concluded that the perpetrators possessed genocidal intent.101
Thus, the contextual analysis places the rapes on par with the killings in terms of assessing
the presence of genocidal intent. Again, rather than extract and mischaracterize the
perpetrators’ intent with respect to the rapes as different from their intent with respect to the
other acts committed to destroy the Tutsi population, the Chamber understood that the same
specific intent permeated the various means to achieve the genocide.

a superior-subordinate relationship.
95

Ibid. ¶ 1665-71, 1683-84. Each defendant received a sentence of life imprisonment. Ibid. ¶ 1762-63.

96

Ibid. ¶ 1477.

97

Prosecutor v. Karemera et al.,Case No. ICTR-98-44-A, Appeal Judgment, 29 September 2014.

98

Ibid. ¶ 623.

99

Ibid. ¶¶ 630- 633.

100

Ibid. ¶ 608.

101

Ibid.
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In sum, a mature judicial reasoning regarding JCE III liability has emerged, as illustrated
by the above jurisprudence, and recently confirmed by the judgment of the Appeals Chamber in the
Karadžić case. Case law over two decades has developed distinct contextual analyses of JCE III
that examines the circumstances of the JCE I common plan and/or JCE II ill-treatment system; the
foreseeability or possibility of JCE III crimes in those circumstances; and JCE III crimes in view
of the continued commission of the specific intent crimes of the JCE I and II. Thoughtful, logical,
non-discriminatory reasoning about SGBV evidence amid unfolding criminality has significantly
guided the development of JCE III.

E. The Judicial and Scholarly Critique of JCE III Liability
Several prominent commentators have lauded the application of JCE III to atrocity related
sexual violence crimes.102 Nevertheless, JCE III has been subject to judicial dissent and scholarly
critiques, challenging its compatibility with the legality principle and the principle of individual
culpability.103

See, e.g., Askin, Prosecuting Wartime Rape, supra n.15, at 340-43; S. SáCouto, ‘Gaps in gender-based violence
jurisprudence of international and hybrid criminal courts: Can human rights law help?’, in C. Ngwena & E. Durojaye
(eds.), Strengthening the protection of sexual and reproductive health and rights in the African region through human
rights (2014). See also D. Scheffer & A. Dinh, ‘The Pre-Trial Chamber’s Significant Decision on Joint Criminal
Enterprise for Individual Responsibility’, Cambodia Tribunal Monitor (June 3, 2010) (arguing all three forms of JCE
are customary international law).
102

Some critics have also, as mentioned above, expressed concerns about the ICTY’s methodology in ‘gap filling’
outside the express terms of the Statutes. See, e.g., G. Sluiter, ‘‘Chapeau elements’ of crimes against humanity in the
jurisprudence of the United Nations ad hoc tribunals’, in L. Sadat (ed.), Forging a Convention for Crimes Against
Humanity (Cambridge 2011).
103
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With respect to the principle of legality, judicial104 and scholarly critiques105 have contested
the customary origins of JCE III and the ad hoc tribunal’s analogy to modes of liability in domestic
legal systems. For instance, in 2010, a Pre-Trial Chamber decision of the Extraordinary Chambers
in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) rejected the customary basis of JCE III as of 1975, the beginning
date of the ECCC’s temporal jurisdiction.106 It found that the war crimes cases decided pursuant to
Control Council Law No. 10 relied on by the ICTY did not explicitly identify JCE III107 as the basis
for their decisions and that the national jurisprudence they cited was similarly insufficient to
establish JCE III’s customary international law basis.108

See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Simić et al., Case No. IT-95-9-T, Trial Chamber Judgment, 17 October 2003, Separate and
Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Per-Johan Lindholm, ¶¶ 2-5; Prosecutor v. Ðorđević, Case No. IT-05-87/1-A, 27
January 2014, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tuzmukhamedov, ¶ 66. See also Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-9724-T, Trial Judgment, 31 July 2003, ¶¶ 436-438 (preferring co-perpetration to JCE liability since co-perpetration ‘is
closer to what most legal systems understand as “committing” and avoids the misleading impression that a new crime
not foreseen in the Statute of this Tribunal has been introduced through the backdoor.’). Judges at other tribunals
have also taken issue with JCE III. See, e,g. Prosecutor v. Sesay, Kallon and Gbao (RUF), Case No. SCSL-04-15-A,
SCSL Appeals Chamber Judgment, 26 October 2009, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Fisher, ¶ 19; ECCC PTC JCE
Decision, supra n. 34.
104

See, e.g., Danner & Martinez, supra n. 9; L. Marsh & M. Ramsden, ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise: Cambodia’s Reply
to Tadić’, 11 International Criminal Law Review 148 (2011); Ohlin, ‘Three Conceptual Problems with the doctrine of
Joint Criminal Enterprise’, supra n. 9, 76; K. Ambos, ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise and Command Responsibility’, 11
Journal of International Criminal Justice 5 (2007); S. Powles, ‘Joint Criminal Enterprise: Criminal Liability by
Prosecutorial Ingenuity and Judicial Creativity?’, 2 Journal of International Criminal Justice 606–619 (2004); J.
Easterday, ‘Obscuring Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability: The Conviction of Augustine Gbao by the Special Court of
Sierra Leone’, 3 Berkeley Journal of International Law Publicist 36 (2009).
105

106

See ECCC PTC JCE Decision, supra n.34, ¶¶ 79-82. The Trial Chamber and Supreme Court Chamber issued
similar decisions, finding insufficient evidence to support the existence of JCE III under customary international law
as of 1975, the start the Extraordinary Chamber’s temporal jurisdiction. See Prosecutor v. Ieng Sary et al, Case No.
002/19-09-2007-ECCC/TC, Trial Chamber Decision on the Applicability of Joint Criminal Enterprise, 12 Sept. 2011,
¶¶ 27-35 [hereinafter ECCC TC JCE Decision]; Prosecutor v. Ieng Sary et al., Case No. 002/19-09-2007ECCC/SCC, Supreme Court Chamber Appeal Judgment, 23 Nov. 2016, ¶ 807 [hereinafter ECCC SCC Appeal
Judgement].
107

ECCC PTC JCE Decision, supra n. 34, ¶ 80.

108

Ibid. ¶ 82. The Trial Chamber also found that state practice in this area lacked sufficient uniformity to be
considered a general principle of law. See ECCC TC JCE Decision, supra n. 106, at ¶ 37.
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Moreover, critics have argued that JCE III holds individuals liable for conduct too distant
from the actions of the accused, since the perpetrator need not intend the foreseeable crime to be
committed nor make any substantial contribution to its commission.109 According to these critics,
JCE III ‘endangers the principle of individual and culpable responsibility by introducing a form of
collective liability, or guilt by association.’110 One commentator famously quipped that this
extended form of JCE liability might as well be called ‘just convict everyone.’111
Thus, notwithstanding the continued use of the JCE III by international tribunals,
extensive challenges to aspects of JCE persist. 112 Although this mode of liability has been
successfully used to hold perpetrators of sexual and gender-based violence accountable, and has
parallels in many domestic legal systems,113 it is not clear whether and to what extent it will
continue to be used successfully to prosecute such crimes at international, hybrid or domestic
criminal tribunals that rely on customary international law.

M. Summers, ‘The Problem of Risk in International Criminal Law’, 13 Washington University Global Studies Law
Review 557, 674 (2014). See also Danner & Martinez, n. 9, at 108-09.
109

Prosecutor v. Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-A, Appeals Chamber Judgement, 8 Oct. 2008, Separate Opinion of
Judge Schomburg, ¶¶ 2, 5 (describing JCE as imposing criminal liability “primarily… [for] membership in a group”).
See also S. Manacorda & C. Meloni, ‘Indirect perpetration versus joint criminal enterprise: Concurring approaches in
the practice of international criminal law?’, 9 Journal International Criminal Justice 166-67 (2011); Danner &
Martinez, supra n. 9, at 133, 137.
110

M. Badar, ‘‘Just convict everyone!’ - Joint perpetration: From Tadić to Stakić and back again’, 6 International
Criminal Law Review 302 (2006).
111

112

The ICTY has considered and rejected a number of additional challenges to the JCE doctrine raised by defence
counsel after Tadić, including, inter alia, in Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
22 March 2006, ¶¶ 99-103 (rejecting the contention that imposition of dolus eventualis as the mens rea for extended
JCE violated the nullum crimen sine lege principle) and Prosecutor v. Milan Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-A, ICTY
Appeal Judgement, 8 Oct. 2008, ¶ 36 (dismissing the argument that the dolus eventualis mens rea requirement of JCE
III necessarily requires a reduced sentence).
See e.g., Prosecutor v. Ieng Sary et al, Co-Prosecutor’s Appeal against the Judgment of the Trial Chamber in Case
002/01, supra n. 6.
113
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III.

The Impact of the ICC’s Modes of Liability Jurisprudence on the Prosecution of
SGBV Crimes
At the International Criminal Court, a troubling pattern is emerging in the manner in which

the Court’s modes of liability jurisprudence is intersecting with crimes of sexual and gender based
violence. The ICC Pre-Trial Chambers departed from the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals and
adopted interpretations of Article 25(3) that were both novel and complex. This may have been a
response to the criticism of the ad hoc tribunals’ approach to JCE, but generally has resulted in an
overly restrictive approach that has also been applied differently to acts of sexual violence than to
other criminal conduct. This has led to acquittals for those accused of SGVB crimes in all cases,
with the exception of Ntaganda. The following section explores this phenomenon.
A.

The ICC’s Restrictive Interpretation of Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute

The drafters of the Rome Statute found the provisions on individual criminal responsibility
in the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals too laconic.114 Thus, during the Statute’s negotiation, States
proposed a more comprehensive provision and eventually adopted Article 25, which sets out a more
detailed framework of liability than predecessor instruments. Subparagraph (3)(a) makes criminally
liable one who commits a crime whether as an individual, jointly with another or through another
person, while subparagraphs (3)(b)–(c) set out a variety of other forms of liability including
ordering, soliciting, inducing, aiding and abetting.115 Subparagraphs (d), (e), and (f) provide liability
for contributing to the commission or attempted commission of a crime by a group, incitement to

It is worth noting, however, that virtually all of the doctrinal criticism – and judicial dissents – discussed earlier
post-date the adoption of the Statute in 1998.
114

115

Rome Statute, supra n. Error! Bookmark not defined., art. 25.
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genocide, and attempt, respectively. Per Saland, who chaired the Working Group on General
Principles of Criminal Law throughout the ICC negotiations, noted that the provision
… posed great difficulties to negotiate in a number of ways. One problem was that
experts from different legal systems took strongly held positions, based on their
national laws, as to the exact content of the various concepts involved. They seemed
to find it hard to understand that another legal system might approach the issue in
another way: e.g., have a different concept, or give the same name to a concept but
with a slightly different content.116
While Article 25 has its origins in the work of the ILC on the Code of Crimes against the Peace and
Security of Mankind, later drafts more closely representing the final version of Article 25 were
proposed by ‘an informal group representing various legal systems’.117 The final version draws on
various sources of national criminal law and international law.118 The vast and divergent literature
on Article 25 indicates, as one of us has suggested in earlier writings, that it is like a ‘Rorschach
blot’, in which scholars tend to see and read into the provision their own experience and
understanding of criminal liability, based on their national legal system.119
The travaux préparatoires of the Rome Statute say little about the content of Article 25.120
Although some scholars have insisted after the fact that Article 25 embodies both a differentiated

P. Saland, ‘International Criminal Law Principles’, in R. Lee (ed.), The International Criminal Court: The Making
of the Rome Statute 198 (1999).
116

117

See Working Paper submitted by Canada, Germany, Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, UN Doc.
A/AC.249/1997/WG.2/DP.1.
118

See van Sliedregt, supra n. 1, at 64–5.

119

Sadat & Jolly, supra n. 2.

120

Sadat & Jolly, supra n. 2. See also W. Schabas, The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome
Statute 424 (Oxford 2010), (“[c]oncepts and words in one system did not necessarily have the same connotations as
they did in others”). C. Bassiouni, Introduction to International Criminal Law 286–7 (Martinus Nijhoff 2nd rev’d ed.,
2013) (many principles of criminal responsibility contained in the Statute reflect either a common law or civilist
approach, with the choice between the two depending on the nature of diplomatic negotiations rather than a
comparative legal analysis’.).
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and hierarchical approach to criminal participation,121 others disagree equally vociferously, noting
that ‘it is difficult to find an unambiguous answer’ to the question of what model of perpetration
and participation it adopts.122 In point of fact, Article 25(3) was a consensus provision that does not
embody a strong and logically cohesive theoretical underpinning of the kind that can be found in
some domestic jurisdictions.123 Rather, as William Schabas has suggested, ‘the terms in paragraph
(b) seem to be drawn from continental models, whereas those of paragraph (c) belong to the
common law’ and ‘should not be viewed as two different or distinct bases of liability, but rather as
an effort to codify exhaustively various forms of complicity by drawing upon concepts familiar to
jurists from different legal traditions’.124
In terms of collective criminal responsibility, or participation in a criminal enterprise, the
Rome Statute does not use the term joint criminal enterprise, in part because it was adopted prior
to the doctrine’s clear emergence at the ICTY.125 As a response to the critique that the ICTY and

See generally K. Ambos, ‘Article 25: Individual Criminal Responsibility’, in O. Triffterer (ed.), Commentary on the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 743 (2008); G. Werle, ‘Individual Criminal Responsibility in Article
25 ICC Statute’, 5 Journal of International Criminal Justice 953, 956-7 (2007). See also L. Yanev & T. Kooijmans,
‘Divided Minds in the Lubanga Trial Judgment: A Case against the Joint Control Theory’, 13 International Criminal
Law Review 789, at 804 (2013) (suggesting that the travaux préparatoires indicate that the drafters aimed to
differentiate between principals and accessories on the basis that an early working paper submitted by Canada (UN
Doc A/AC.249/L.4) contained a draft article on ‘principals’ and a separate one on ‘the responsibility of other persons
in the completed crimes of principals’). However, Article 25 in its final form merges all modes of liability into the one
provision and does not contain the language of ‘principals’ and ‘the responsibility of other persons in the completed
crimes of principals.’ It is thus arguable that the negotiators intended to move away from a strict principal/accessory
distinction by actually removing such specific language.
121

122

Eser, supra n. 7, at 786–8.

123

Further, it has been argued by some scholars that ordering (under paragraph 3(b)) is better categorized as belonging
to paragraph 3(a) (commission ‘through another person’). See Ambos, supra n.121, at 765; Eser, supra n. 7, at 797.
124

Schabas, supra n. 120, at 431.

The Rome Statute was adopted in July 1998, whereas JCE was developed in the Tadić case, which was decided by
the ICTY Appeals Chamber in July of 1999. See Tadić, supra n. 1.
125
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ICTR Statutes had omitted conspiracy (except as regards the crime of genocide), and in search for
a form of ‘common plan’ liability, the Statute incorporated a specific paragraph on common plan
liability (paragraph 3(d)), the text of which was drawn from the International Convention for the
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.126 According to the chair of the Working Group on General
Principles of Criminal Law, this avoided divisive discussions about incorporating the concept of
conspiracy, which was rejected by most States Parties, although common law countries advocated
for it extensively.127 While some scholars now argue that 25(3)(d) is a ‘residual’ form of liability,
that was not at all apparent in 1998, and following the Tadić Appeals Chamber decision, there was
at least some thought that this might be a Rome Statute version of JCE, given that the text refers to
the individual contributing ‘to the commission or attempted commission of . . . a crime by a group
of persons acting with a common purpose’.128 In fact, one leading scholar has recently suggested
that JCE I and II may be included in this provision.129
No sooner had the Rome Statute become operational, however, than a group of scholars
insisted on an interpretation of Article 25 that would cause it to diverge dramatically from the
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals and customary international law. In Prosecutor v. Thomas

126

See Terrorist Bombing Convention, supra n. 42, at art. 2(3)(c).

127

See Saland, supra n.116, at 199–200(‘[w]e were helped by the successful negotiations in 1997 of the Convention
for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, which had been adopted by consensus. In Rome, it was easy to reach
agreement to incorporate, with slight modifications, the text from the Convention which we now find in paragraph 3(d)
of the Article 25 of the Rome Statute.’). See also T. Weigend, ‘Intent, Mistake of Law, and Co-Perpetration in the
Lubanga Decision on Confirmation of Charges’, 6 Journal of International Criminal Justice 471, 477–8 (2008); Werle,
supra n. 121, at 970–1, 974–5 (arguing Article 25(3)(d) is a subsidiary mode of participation yielding the weakest form
of liability but that it may also broadly cover acts that warranted liability under the ICTY’s case law on JCE).
128

Rome Statute, supra n. 8, art. 25(3)(d).

129

E. van Sliedregt, Lecture, Siracusa (Italy), May 30, 2018.
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Lubanga Dyilo,130 the ICC’s first completed trial and judgment, the majority assigned a complex
meaning to Article 25(3)(a), based upon German theorist Claus Roxin’s ‘control of the crime’
theory.131 Essentially the judges parsed the meaning of the words ‘commits such a crime, whether
as an individual, jointly with another or through another person’ to create three separate forms of
‘commission’ liability: individual perpetration, direct co-perpetration and indirect co-perpetration.
For both direct and indirect co-perpetration, an essential element of the offense would be the
establishment of a ‘common plan’,132 and the accused’s contribution to the plan had to be
‘essential’.133 Indirect co-perpetration added as a requirement (in the Katanga case discussed
below)134 that the accused also had control over an organization through which he committed the
crime.135 This, the judges found, was an appropriate use of Roxin’s theory.136

130

Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the
Statute, Trial Chamber I, 14 March 2012 [hereinafter Lubanga Trial Judgment].
Ibid., at ¶¶ 918–33, 976–1006. See in particular ¶ 999, n. 2705 (citing a long line of the Court’s jurisprudence in
support of its view that “the contribution of the co-perpetrator must be essential”).
131

132

Ibid. ¶ 981.

133

Ibid. ¶ 999.

134

See Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3319, Trial Chamber II, Judgment pursuant to
article 74 of the Statute, 7 March 2014, [hereinafter Katanga Trial Chamber Judgment].
135

Ibid., ¶ 1410-1411.

136

The control of the crime theory began appearing in Pre-Trial Chamber decisions in the Lubanga Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber I, 29 January 2012.
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Two judges, Adrian Fulford (in the Lubanga case)137 and Christine Van Den Wyngaert (in
Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui),138 have taken issue with the elaboration of the Court’s
modes of liability doctrine, noting that it had improperly imported the control of the crime theory
from national law into Article 25 and that this interpretation was inconsistent with the text of the
Statute. Many scholars, including one of us,139 have similarly argued that the Court’s interpretation
neither comports with the ‘plain meaning’ of the Statute nor is appropriate under the interpretative
methods open to the judges under Article 21 of the Statute.
It is ironic that just as the critiques of the ICTY’s JCE doctrine intimated that the Tribunal’s
judges had engaged in judicial activism and improperly incorporated common law doctrine into
international criminal law,140 the ICC’s judges elaborated a stunningly complex interpretation of
Article 25, subjecting themselves to the same critique, perhaps even more so.141 Although the ICC’s
case law may well be more favourable to the accused than the ICTY’s, perhaps in response to the
complaint that JCE was overly favourable to the prosecution, it is neither well-grounded in the
Statute nor mandated by customary international law. Nor have the critics of JCE established that

137

Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgement Pursuant to Article 74 of the
Statute, Trial Chamber I, 14 March 2012, Separate Opinion of Judge Adrian Fulford [hereinafter Lubanga Trial
Judgment (Fulford Opinion)].
138

Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Judgement Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber II, 18
December 2012, Concurring Opinion of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert to [hereinafter Ngudjolo Trial Judgement
(Van den Wyngaert Opinion)].
139

See Sadat & Jolly, supra n. 2.

See, in particular, Judge Wolfgang Schomburg’s separate opinion in Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, where he argued
for the control of the crime theory to be used at the ICTR. Prosecutor v. Gacumbitsi, Case No. ICTR-2001-64-A,
Judgement, 7 July 2006, Separate Opinion of Judge Wolfgang Schomburg on the Criminal Responsibility of the
Appellant for Committing Genocide.
140

141

Sadat & Jolly, supra n. 2.
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its application led to any wrongful convictions or a miscarriage of justice,142 suggesting that the
moniker ‘just convict everyone’ is simply invalid and unfounded.
Finally, this new doctrine has produced, perhaps unintentionally, an additional problem:
by restricting the application of Article 25(3)(a) to principal liability and limiting it to those with
control over the crime, the Court has had to rely on Article 25(3)(d) in cases of group liability where
the facts do not support such a limited interpretation.143 This has led – as the next section describes
– to high rates of impunity for SGBV crimes.
B.

The Absence of Gender Competence in the ICC’s Application of Article
25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute to SGBV Crimes

As noted above, the additional elements required to establish ‘commission’ of a crime at the
ICC are perhaps more favourable to the accused than analogous ICTY case law. Yet, as the
discussion of the Katanga case below reveals, this interpretation of ‘commission’ has led the Court
to reject the application of common purpose liability under Article 25(3)(a) in favour of Article
25(3)(d). At the same time, the Court has applied this provision differently to acts of sexual violence
than to other crimes, even though the sexual violence occurred simultaneously at the hands of the
same group of perpetrators. The result, as Katanga illustrates, has been a high level of impunity for
sexual violence crimes.
Germain Katanga, the commander of the Ituri-based Walendu-Bindi collectivité, a Ngiti
militia group in the DRC, was accused of co-orchestrating an attack on the village of Bogoro in the

142

Indeed, three defence counsel who represented different accused before international tribunals, confirmed that they
could not recall a single case in which an accused had been convicted on the basis of JCE III that they felt amounted
to a miscarriage of justice. Discussions with defence counsel, in The Hague (May 28 and 29 and Jun. 6, 2019)
(“Defence counsel Hague discussions”).
143

Note that, as discussed infra, the Trial Chamber in Ntaganda found that the accused had control over the crime,
see infra n. 257-258 and accompanying text, and thus did not need to consider his liability under Article 25(3)(d).
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region of Ituri on 24 February 2003 and charged with the war crimes of rape, sexual slavery,
outrages upon personal dignity, directing an attack against a civilian population, wilful killings,
destruction of property and using child soldiers, and the crimes against humanity of rape, sexual
slavery and murder.144 He was initially charged under Article 25(3)(a) as a co-perpetrator for the
crime of using child soldiers and as an indirect co-perpetrator for all other crimes. However, during
the deliberation phase at the end of the trial, the majority of the Trial Chamber notified the parties
that they would consider whether the evidence presented during the trial actually satisfied a
different mode of liability, namely common purpose liability under Article 25(3)(d)(ii).145
The Trial Chamber’s decision to alter the mode of liability from Article 25(3)(a) to Article
25(3)(d) had to do with the Court’s earlier restrictive interpretation of Article 25(3)(a). After
reviewing the evidence – in particular evidence relating to Katanga’s contribution as coordinator of
the preparations for the attack on Bogoro – the Trial Chamber’s majority came to the conclusion
that the evidence better supported liability under Article 25(3)(d) than under Article 25(3)(a).146
This was later confirmed in the judgement issued by the Trial Chamber, which having chosen to

144

In the confirmation of charges decision, the rape and sexual slavery charges were the only crimes not confirmed
unanimously as Dissenting Judge Anita Ušacka found that although there were substantial grounds to believe that
members of Katanga’s militia had committed rape and sexual slavery after the Bogoro attack, there was insufficient
evidence linking Katanga to these crimes. Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No.
ICC-01/04-01/07-717, Pre-Trial Chamber I, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Partly Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Anita Ušacka, p. 222-24, ¶¶ 27-29 [hereinafter Katanga and Ngudjolo Decision on the Confirmation of
Charges].
145

Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-3319, Decision on the
implementation of regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and severing the charges against the accused persons,
21 Nov. 2012 [hereinafter Katanga Regulation 55 Decision]. The decision to consider Article 25(3)(d)(ii) liability
was intended to apply to all crimes except using child soldiers to participate in hostilities. Ibid.
146

Ibid., at ¶¶ 5-7. Of course, the difficulty of recharacterising the mode of liability could have been avoided had
earlier jurisprudence not (erroneously) insisted that the Prosecutor choose only one form of criminal participation for
the case, and simply allowed the charges to be brought in the alternative (as is now permitted). See L.N. Sadat,
‘Crimes Against Humanity in the Modern Age’, 107 American Journal of International Law 334 (2013).
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follow Lubanga’s control over the crime approach to distinguish between principals and
accessories, found the evidence insufficient to support Article 25(3)(a) liability.147 As laid out in
Katanga, indirect perpetration under Article 25(3)(a) requires proof of both ‘the existence of an
organised and hierarchical apparatus of power, characterised by near-automatic obedience to the
orders it hands down’ and the perpetrator’s ‘control and genuine authority over the
organization…[such that he is able] to steer it intentionally towards the commission of a crime,
without leaving one of the subordinates at liberty to decide whether the crime is to be executed’.148
Applying this standard, the Chamber concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish that
‘(1) in February 2003, the Ngiti militia was an organised apparatus of power; and (2) Germain
Katanga, at that time, wielded control over the militia such as to exert control over the crimes for
the purposes of article 25(3)(a) of the Statute’.149
The Court then turned its attention to Article 25(3)(d), which attaches criminal liability to
anyone who ‘[i]n any other way contributes to the commission or attempted commission of such a
crime by a group of persons acting with a common purpose’.150 The contribution must ‘be
intentional’ and either: ‘(i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal
purpose of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the

147

See Katanga Trial Chamber Judgement, supra n. 134, ¶¶ 1383-1396, 1417-1420.

148

Ibid. ¶¶ 1410-1411.

149

Ibid., ¶ 1420. Significantly, this restrictive interpretation of Article 25(3)(a) is likely to serve as a particularly high
bar for sexual violence charges, as even if the first of these criteria were met, it will likely be difficult to prove that
those accused of such crimes ‘unquestionably… conceived the crime, oversaw its preparation at different hierarchical
levels, and controlled its performance and execution’, see ibid. ¶1412, given that sexual violence – even when
widespread – often occurs because it is tolerated and permitted rather than explicitly ordered or planned.
150

Rome Statute, supra n. 8, art. 25(3)(d).
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jurisdiction of the Court; or (ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit
the crime’.151
The Trial Chamber interpreted this mode as ‘a residual form of accessory liability, included
in the Statute to vest the Court with jurisdiction over accessories whose conduct does not constitute
aiding or abetting the commission of a crime within the meaning of article 25(3)(c)’.152 According
to the Chamber, this mode differs from JCE in that it cannot be used to attach liability to an accused
for crimes which form part of the common purpose but to which he or she did not contribute.153
According to the Trial Chamber, an accused’s ‘contribution may be connected to either the material
elements of the crime’ (for instance, the provision of resources such as weapons) ‘or their subjective
elements’ (which may involve tacit or explicit encouragement).154 Further, it held that although the
group of persons acting with a common purpose must harbour the same intent to commit the crime
and the contribution must be made in the knowledge of that intent, intent can be demonstrated either
by showing the group meant to cause the consequences that constituted the crime or were aware
that the crime would occur in the ordinary course of events.155
In March 2014, a majority of the Trial Chamber convicted Germain Katanga as an accessory
for all crimes with which he was charged except for rape and sexual slavery as war crimes and
crimes against humanity and the war crime of using child soldiers. Specifically, the Chamber

151

Ibid.

152

Katanga Trial Chamber Judgement, supra n. 134, ¶ 1618.

153

Ibid. ¶ 1619. This may be why it has not engendered the same kind of critique as JCE III.

154

Ibid. ¶ 1635.

155

Ibid. ¶¶ 1627, 1641.
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convicted Katanga as an accessory to the war crimes of directing an attack against a civilian
population, pillaging, and destruction of property, as well as murder as a war crime and a crime
against humanity, but unanimously acquitted Katanga as an accessory to rape and sexual slavery as
war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as of the war crime of using child soldiers.156 The
acquittal on the sexual violence charges was not due to an absence of credible evidence regarding
the acts of sexual violence. In fact, the Chamber recognized that rape and sexual slavery had been
committed by Katanga’s fighters on the day of the Bogoro attack.157 What the Chamber found was
that the sexual violence crimes were not part of the common purpose of the attack, unlike the crimes
of directing an attack against a civilian population, pillage, murder and destruction of property.158
The Trial Chamber’s application of common purpose liability to the sexual violence crimes
is troubling. The Trial Chamber found that the purpose of Katanga’s militia was not only to
reconquer Bogoro from the opposing (UPC) troops but also to ‘wipe out’ the ‘Hema civilians’ from
the village.159 It looked at the manner of the attack – including that it was initiated in the dark against
civilians, and that the crimes were committed systematically, with ‘great violence’ and
accompanied by ethnic references – to conclude that the militia did, in fact, have ‘a common
purpose of a criminal nature’.160

156

Ibid. § XII, 7.

157

Ibid. ¶¶ 988-999, 1002-1019.

158

Ibid. ¶¶ 1657-1664.

159

Ibid. ¶ 1654.

160

Ibid. ¶ 1656.
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The Trial Chamber then looked at whether the particular charged acts formed part of the
common plan. It found that murder, directing an attack against a civilian population, pillaging, and
destruction of property were part of this common purpose, in part because of the scale of the crimes
and the fact that Katanga’s militia had engaged in these acts prior to the attack on Bogoro, enabling
it to conclude that they must have been intended and therefore part of the common purpose.161 The
Chamber went on to note that, in contrast to these crimes, there was no evidence that rape and
sexual slavery had been committed on a wide scale or that these crimes had been committed by
Katanga’s militia before the attack on Bogoro.162 It found that the ‘obliteration’ of Bogoro did not,
therefore, ‘perforce entail[] the commission of [rape and sexual enslavement]’.163 Oddly, it
concluded that ‘although rape and enslavement formed an integral part of the militia’s design to
attack the predominantly Hema civilian population of Bogoro’,164 these crimes did not form part of
the group’s common purpose.165

161

Ibid., ¶¶ 1658-1662.

162

Ibid. ¶ 1663.

163

164

Ibid.
Ibid. ¶ 1664 (emphasis added).

This conclusion is also surprising in light of the Pre-Trial Chamber’s earlier findings that Katanga knew ‘that, as a
consequence of the common plan, rape and sexual slavery of women and girls would occur in the ordinary course of
the events.’ Katanga & Ngudjolo Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, supra n. 144, ¶ 567. Significantly,
according to the Pre-Trial Chamber, this knowledge ‘was substantiated by the fact that:
165

(i) rape and sexual slavery against of women and girls constituted a common practice in the region of Ituri
throughout the protracted armed conflict;
(ii) such common practice was widely acknowledged amongst the soldiers and the commanders;
(iii) in previous and subsequent attacks against the civilian population, the militias led and used by the
suspects to perpetrate attacks repeatedly committed rape and sexual slavery against women and girls living
in Ituri;
(iv) the soldiers and child soldiers were trained (and grew up) in camps in which women and girls were
constantly raped and kept in conditions to ease sexual slavery;
(v) Germain Katanga, Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui and their commanders visited the camps under their control,
frequently received reports of the activities of the camps by the camps commanders under their command,
and were in permanent contact with the combatants during the attacks, including the attack on Bogoro;
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The Trial Chamber’s common purpose analysis is problematic for a number of reasons.
First, it seems to imply that for an act to be part of the group’s common purpose – absent direct
evidence that the group agreed to commit the act – it has to both have been committed on a wide
scale and repeated basis and have occurred prior to the attack in question. Notably, neither of these
factors is identified in the Chamber’s own findings on what the law requires or what would be
sufficient to show that an act is part of the group’s common purpose in the absence of direct
evidence.166 In the part of the judgment interpreting the relevant law, the Chamber adopts an
approach that excludes from the common purpose only those ‘crimes ensuing…from opportunistic
acts by members of the group.’167 It is hard to see how the rape and sexual enslavement of Hema
women was merely opportunistic when these crimes were committed on the same day as the crimes
committed against other members of the Hema community in Bogoro and, by the Chamber’s own

(vi) the fate reserved to captured women and girls was widely known amongst combatants; and
(vii) the suspects and the combatants were aware, for example, which camps and which commanders more
frequently engaged in this practice’.
Ibid. at ¶¶ 567-68. Based on this, the Chamber concluded that when the accused ‘planned, ordered and monitored the
attack on Bogoro and on other villages inhabited mainly by Hema population, the suspects knew that rape and sexual
slavery would be committed in the ordinary course of the events.’ Katanga & Ngudjolo Confirmation Decision, supra
n. 144, ¶ 569.
166

See Katanga Trial Chamber Judgement, supra n. 134, at ¶¶ 1624-1631. This is consistent with customary
international law, where ‘there is no requirement that sexual violence occur on a large scale to be part of a common
criminal purpose’. See S. Brammertz & M. Jarvis (eds.), Prosecuting Conflict-Related Sexual Violence at the ICTY, at
6 (Oxford 2016). While scale and prior use of the same acts may help show that sexual violence was part of the
common purpose, other factors may also be relevant and sufficient to show this, such as the role sexual violence
played in achieving the objectives of the JCE members. Ibid. at 5-7, 226. See also M. Jarvis, ‘Prosecuting ConflictRelated Sexual Violence Crimes: How Far We Have Progressed and Where Do We Go From Here: Some Thoughts
Based on ICTY Experience’, in D. Stephens & P. Babie (eds.), Imagining law: essays in conversation with Judith
Gardam 121 (2016) (noting that in Prosecutor v. Stakić, for instance, the focus of the ICTY was not on scale or
patterns, but on the objective of the JCE members and the role sexual violence played in achieving that objective).
167

Katanga Trial Chamber Judgement, supra n. 134, ¶ 1630.
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assessment, ‘formed an integral part of the militia’s design to attack the predominantly Hema
civilian population of Bogoro’.168
Second, even if scale were required, it is unclear why the scale of the sexual violence was
insufficient here. Only three witnesses testified to the rape, as opposed to 60 people who the
Chamber found had been killed in the attack.169 However, each of them testified to being raped
multiple times, with a total of 17 acts of rape occurring during the attack on Bogoro. 170 Moreover,
all of these witnesses were enslaved at a camp run by Katanga’s militia following the attack, for a
period of one to eighteen months.171 It is hard to see why 17 acts of rape and subsequent
enslavement for months do not qualify as crimes committed on a wide scale or repeated basis.
Indeed, the Chamber’s failure to consider the number of assaults or the subsequent months of sexual
enslavement shows a lack of gender competence in assessing the evidence related to the gender
crimes.
Although it did not say so explicitly, perhaps the Chamber had difficulty finding that the
sexual violence crimes were crimes the group either intended to commit or would occur within the
ordinary course of events, which the accused must have been aware of at the time the crimes were
committed.172 Yet, in its discussion of the law, the Chamber itself notes that a group’s common

168

Ibid. ¶ 1664. Although the Chamber may have been using scale and previous commission of crimes as
circumstantial evidence from which it could infer whether those crimes formed part of the common purpose, it does
not examine – as its statement of the law suggests would be necessary – whether the sexual violence committed in
Bogoro was, in fact, merely opportunistic. Had it asked this question and applied its own standard, it might have
been prompted to take into account evidence it apparently failed to consider – such as the sexual enslavement of the
victims, in some cases, for months after the attack – and conclude that the acts were not opportunistic.
169

Ibid. ¶¶ 841, 950.

170

Ibid, ¶¶988-999.

171

Ibid. ¶¶ 1002-1021.

172

Ibid. ¶ 1630.
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purpose need not have been previously agreed upon; it can ‘materialize extemporaneously’ and ‘be
inferred from the subsequent concerted action of the group of persons’.173 Katanga’s militia not
only repeatedly raped the women but enslaved them after the attack for up to eighteen months. Even
if the militia had not committed prior acts of sexual violence, the repeated acts of rape and
subsequent months-long enslavement of Hema victims were evidence from which the Chamber
could have inferred that the crimes were either intended or would occur within the ordinary course
of events. Again, the failure to do so suggests a lack of gender competence in evaluating the
evidence of SGBV crimes.
More significantly, the Chamber’s analysis appears to ignore the way in which sexual
violence has been used in other conflicts to achieve the very kind of purpose the Chamber indicates
the militia wanted to accomplish, i.e. to forcibly displace or wipe out a rival ethnic group. Although
the Chamber stated that it would reference the common purpose jurisprudence of the ICTY and the
ICTR,174 it failed to cite cases from these tribunals which had found that sexual violence had been
used effectively to destroy or discriminate against a particular group and/or to drive them out of a
particular territory and, therefore, formed part of the perpetrators’ common purpose. For instance,
in the Stakić case, the ICTY Appeals Chamber found that the common purpose of Stakić and other
JCE members was to deport Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from the town of Prijedor in
Bosnia and to persecute them in order to establish Serbian control over that territory. 175 Importantly,
the Trial Chamber had recognized that forcing people to flee required waging a persecution

173

Ibid. ¶ 1626.

174

Katanga Trial Chamber Judgement, supra n. 134, at ¶ 1625.

175

See, e.g., Stakić, Appeal Judgement, supra n.112, ¶¶ 73, 84.
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campaign against Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, which in turn was accomplished through
various acts of violence, including sexual violence.176 In confirming Stakić’s conviction for
persecution, including through acts of sexual violence, the Appeals Chamber recognized that sexual
violence formed part of the group’s common purpose.177
In Katanga, the Trial Chamber examined the SGBV crimes apart from the other violent
acts, as if they were somehow unconnected to the violence targeted against the very same civilians.
The Chamber suggested that because the victims denied their ethnicity (which they did to avoid
being targeted178), the rapes were somehow not connected to the victims’ ethnicity, and therefore
not a part of the intended attack against the Hema in Bogoro. Yet, as one author has noted, the
transcripts of the witness testimonies indicate that they were all ‘asked about their ethnic identity
repeatedly before and after being raped’,179 suggesting that the issue of ethnicity was clearly related
to the rapes irrespective of whether the victims denied their Hema heritage. As in Stakić, there was
ample evidence in the record from which it could be inferred that that sexual violence was used –
like the other crimes – to drive the Hema population from Bogoro.
It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the Chamber in Katanga isolated and treated SGBV
crimes differently, both factually and legally, from the other charged crimes. Rather than viewing

Stakić Trial Judgement, supra n. 104, ¶¶ 234-36, 240-41, 244, 791-806, 826 (finding sexual violence committed in
the Trnopolje, Keratrem, and Omarska prison camps in Prijedor was a critical part of the persecution campaign).
176

177

See also Kvočka Trial Judgement, supra n. 62, ¶¶ 319-20, 327 (finding a system of ill-treatment at the Omarska
camp in Prijedor which aimed to ‘persecute and subjugate non-Serb detainees’ through the commission of crimes,
including rape, thus recognizing sexual violence as part of the common criminal purpose under JCE II). Although two
of the accused’s convictions were overturned on appeal, these findings were upheld on appeal. Prosecutor v. Kvočka
et al, Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, Appeal Judgement, 28 February 2005, ¶¶ 84-86.
178

See, e.g., Katanga Trial Chamber Judgement, supra n. 134, ¶¶ 829, 1009.

179

B. Inder, Partial Conviction of Katanga by ICC Acquittals for Sexual Violence and Use of Child Soldiers: The
Prosecutor vs. Germain Katanga, 7 March 2014, at 7, http://iccwomen.org/images/Katanga-Judgement-Statementcorr.pdf.
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the evidence in the record as linking the sexual violence with the broader context in which it
occurred, the Chamber analyses these crimes separately, requiring more concrete evidence than its
own findings on common purpose liability suggest is legally required to show that the sexual
violence was part of the common plan.
Importantly, even if the Chamber had found that the sexual violence crimes were part of the
common plan, it is not clear that the Chamber would have found Katanga liable for these crimes
under Article 25(3)(d), as per this provision, Katanga’s contribution would have to be ‘intentional’
and either: ‘(i) made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose of the
group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of a crime within the jurisdiction
of the Court; or (ii) made in the knowledge of the intention of the group to commit the crime.’180
According to the Chamber’s interpretation of Article 25(3)(d)(ii), ‘[k]nowledge must be established
for each specific crime and knowledge of a general criminal intention will not suffice to prove …
that the accused knew of the group’s intention to commit each of the crimes forming part of the
common purpose.’181 Moreover, the accused must be aware this intention existed ‘when engaging
in the conduct which constituted his or her contribution’.182 Given the Chamber’s refusal to consider
the repeated acts of rape during the attack and the subsequent months-long enslavement of Hema
victims in its analysis of the militia’s common purpose, it is unlikely that the Chamber would find

180

Rome Statute, supra n. Error! Bookmark not defined., art. 25(3)(d).

181

Katanga Trial Chamber Judgement, supra n.134, ¶ 1642 (emphasis added).

182

Ibid. ¶ 1641.
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these same facts sufficient to show Katanga had contributed to the attack with the knowledge that
the group intended to commit these crimes at the time he made his contribution.183
The take-away from Katanga is clear. First, a restrictive interpretation of Article 25(3)(a) is
likely to serve as a particularly high bar for cases involving sexual violence charges. It will likely
be difficult to prove that those accused of SGBV ‘unquestionably… conceived the crime, oversaw
its preparation at different hierarchical levels, and controlled its performance and execution,’ as
required by the Court’s doctrinal construction of indirect perpetration,184 given that sexual violence
– even when widespread – often occurs because it is tolerated and permitted rather than explicitly
ordered or planned.185 Second, even though common purpose liability under Article 25(3)(d) can
theoretically be used to hold perpetrators accountable for sexual violence crimes and the provision
has not been subject to the same level of critique as JCE III liability, that provision has been applied
differently to sexual violence crimes than other crimes, resulting in the acquittal of SGBV charges.
Thus, the combination of a restrictive interpretation of Article 23(a) with a lack of gender

183

While the Chamber does not separately analyse the requirements of Article 25(3)(d)(i), it is not clear that it would
find the facts in Katanga sufficient to meet the requirements of that provision either, given its analysis of criminal
purpose as requiring that the participants in the common purpose “harbour the same intent,” meaning “they must
mean to cause the consequences which constitutes the crime or be aware that the crime will occur in the ordinary
course of events.” Katanga Trial Chamber Judgement, supra n. 134, ¶1627.
184

Ibid. ¶ 1412.

185

As discussed in Section IV.B. below, however, the Ntaganda case demonstrates that this is not impossible. If the
Court contextualizes the sexual violence and recognizes it as part of the common plan, as it did in Ntaganda, it may
be feasible to use Article 25(3)(a) in cases of sexual violence. See infra n. 249-257 and accompanying text. However,
as noted earlier, that case is still subject to appeal and it is not clear that, if it chooses to review the case, the Appeal
Chamber will affirm the Trial Chamber’s approach. Moreover, Ntaganda’s liability as an indirect co-perpetrator still
required the Chamber to assess the accused’s control over the crime. While it found such control to be present in that
case, cases in which sexual violence unfolds as part of the plan but evidence of the accused’s control over the crime is
less compelling would still likely fail.
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competence in applying the elements of Article 25(3)(d) to SGBV crimes has led to a high level of
impunity for those crimes.186

IV.

Two Trains Running – Customary International Law and the Rome Legal Regime
The above analysis suggests that accurately capturing and characterizing individual

contributions to collective criminal conduct, particularly when that conduct involves sexual and
gender based violence, remains a challenge for international courts and tribunals. Despite
significant advances in the development of sophisticated theories designed to hold individuals
responsible for their role in atrocity crimes and the recognition of rape and other forms of sexual
violence as war crimes, crimes against humanity and even acts of genocide, the cases discussed in
the previous section demonstrate that judges struggle with how to understand and situate sexual and
gender based violence within the context of other atrocity crimes.
The solution, moving forward, will undoubtedly need to operate on several tracks. For
various reasons, including perhaps the ‘positive complementarity’ incentive on States to investigate

186

To the extent that one of the accused in the group is a military or civilian superior with effective control over his
or her subordinates, another alternative could be to charge that accused with command responsibility under Article 28
of the Rome Statute. As noted earlier, however, the one case in which an accused was convicted by a Trial Chamber
for SGBV crimes under command responsibility was reversed by the Appeals Chamber, see Bemba Appeals
Chamber Judgment, supra n. 11, suggesting that some of the difficulties we identify in the Court’s application of
Article 25 also apply to its approach to command responsibility. See SáCouto & Sellers, supra n.12. More
significantly, perhaps, while superior responsibility or other modes of liability such as complicity might be used to
hold perpetrators liable for SGBV crimes, these forms of liability do not always capture the full culpability of an
accused. The principle of fair labeling – described as fairly representing the nature and magnitude of a wrong by
recognizing, through the law, distinctions between kinds of offences and degrees of wrongdoing, A. Ashworth,
Principles of Criminal Law 86 (1995) – arguably requires that an accused be charged with some form of group or
common purpose liability if circumstances so warrant, even if the accused could also be prosecuted under other
modes of liability. Yet the ICC’s restrictive interpretation of Article 25(3)(a) and lack of gender competence in its
application of Article 25(3)(d) makes it difficult to characterize responsibility for SGBV crimes as such.
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and prosecute atrocity crimes within their own domestic systems, 187 we have seen – and may
continue to see – an increasing number of States trying atrocity crimes at home.188 Some have
incorporated the Rome Statute into their domestic legal systems, while others rely on existing penal
codes and customary international law to try international crimes. Moreover, we will likely continue
to see the establishment of new hybrid or internationally-supported tribunals with temporal
mandates requiring the application of customary international law. Thus, it is important to explore
potential solutions to the problems we have identified under both the Rome Statute and customary
international law.
A.

JCE III under customary international law

Our first recommendation – relevant primarily to jurisdictions applying customary
international law189 – is to push back against the critique of JCE III. First, we disagree with the
scholarly criticism and judicial dissents that reject JCE III’s customary basis. As an initial matter,
we find the ad hoc tribunals’ response to these challenges persuasive.
In the Đorđević case, for instance, the accused challenged the bona fides of JCE’s customary
origins, arguing that the Appeals Chamber should depart from its previous decisions because the
reasoning set out in the Tadić Appeal Judgement is “shallow and uncertain”’.190 In support, he cited,

The ICC’s Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) 2006 Report on Prosecutorial Strategy explains: ‘the Office has adopted
a positive approach to complementarity, meaning that it encourages genuine national proceedings where possible;
relies on national and international networks; and participates in a system of international cooperation.’ Int’l Criminal
Court, Office of The Prosecutor, Report on Prosecutorial Strategy, 14 September 2006, at 5 (emphasis in original).
187

See, e.g. ‘Part IV: Complementarity in Practice’, in C. Stahn & M. El Zeidy (eds.), The International Criminal
Court and Complementarity: From Theory to Practice (2011).
188

189

Note that customary international law may also be relevant to the interpretation of the Rome Statute. See Rome
Statute, supra n. Error! Bookmark not defined. , art. 21(1).
190

Đorđević Appeals Chamber Judgement, supra n. 62, at ¶ 25.
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inter alia, the ECCC’s Pre-Trial Chamber decision that concluded that JCE III was not rooted in
customary law by the 1970’s, the relevant time of the Khmer Rouge genocide.191 The ICTY Appeals
Chamber disagreed and affirmed the customary basis of JCE III.192 We concur for several reasons.
First, JCE III is rooted in legal instruments and the case law of the post-WWII era. For
example, the final clause of Article 6 of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal
established that:
Leaders, organisers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation or
execution of a Common Plan or Conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes
[crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity] are responsible
for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan.193
In other words, the IMT Charter provided that a person who participated in a common plan or
conspiracy to commit any crime under the Charter could be held liable for all acts resulting from
the execution of that common plan or conspiracy.194 Similarly, Control Council Law No. 10
provided that a person could be held criminally responsible for a crime if he ‘was connected with
plans or enterprises involving its commission’,195 without any requirement that the crime in
question have been intended.

191

Ibid. ¶ 46.

192

Ibid. ¶ 58.

193

See Charter of the International Military Tribunal art. 6, annex to Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment
of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis art. 6, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.C. 280.
194

Such liability is broader than JCE I, which provides liability only for those crimes that were within the common
plan, and encompasses foreseeable crimes, as the French judge on the IMT confirmed. Indeed, that judge later wrote
that Article 6 required ‘conduct aimed at the same result’ and ‘did not embrace crimes “which were not intended or
foreseen”’, suggesting that foreseeable crimes came within the statute. R. Clarke, ‘Return to Borkum Island:
Extended Joint Criminal Enterprise Responsibility in the Wake of World War II’, 9 Journal of International Criminal
Justice 839, 845 (2011) (quoting Donnedieu de Vabres).
195

Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against
Humanity, art. II(2)(d), reprinted in 3 Trials of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals XVIII (William
S. Hein & Co. 1997), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_Vol-III.pdf.
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The case law of the post-World War II tribunals further confirms that JCE III was a
recognized mode of liability well before the establishment of the ICTY. Although the lack of
reasoned judgments in many cases makes it difficult to determine with certainty the exact mode of
liability applied, a careful review of the facts of those cases strongly supports the conclusion that
they applied a mode of liability akin to JCE III. For example, in the Essen Lynching case, a Germany
Army Captain instructed a private to transport three British prisoners of war through the town of
Essen, and not to interfere if the civilian crowd were to ‘molest’ the prisoners – an instruction given
within hearing of the crowd.196 The crowd then proceeded to beat the prisoners, ultimately killing
them.197 Together, the captain, private, and crowd all implicitly agreed upon a common purpose –
to attack the prisoners – thereby causing them injury. Even though it was unclear who struck the
fatal blow, the five defendants were found guilty of the war crime of killing – not just assaulting –
a prisoner of war, suggesting that the tribunal found them guilty of the foreseeable crime of murder
and not just the agreed upon assault.198 The Borkum Island case is similar. There, several airmen
were killed by a civilian crowd after the military commander ordered his subordinates not to
interfere with any attack by the crowd.199 Although there was evidence that many of the civilians

Trial of Erich Heyer and Six Others (‘The Essen Lynching Case’) (Brit. Mil. Ct. for the Trial of War Criminals,
Essen, 18th-19th and 21st-22nd Dec., 1945), discussed at I U.N. War Crimes Comm’n, Law Reports of Trials of War
Criminals 89 (1947), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/Law-Reports_Vol-1.pdf.
196

197

Ibid. at 88, 90.

198

There was some evidence that the captain may have suggested that the prisoners of war should be shot, though it is
unclear whether the court accepted that evidence. Ibid. at 90.
Deputy Judge Advocate’s Office, Review and Recommendation at 2 et seq., United States v. Goebell (Aug. 1,
1947), https://www.legal-tools.org/doc/aeb036/pdf/. See also R. Clarke, ‘Return to Borkum Island: Extended Joint
Criminal Enterprise Responsibility in the Wake of World War II’, 9 Journal International of Criminal Justice 839,
841-43 (2011).
199
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intended their murder,200 there was no evidence that the commander intended that the prisoners be
killed, rather than assaulted.201 Nonetheless, the commander was found guilty in their deaths.202
Third, we find the ECCC decision rejecting the customary status of JCE III to be
unpersuasive.203 Not only did the ECCC Pre-trial Chamber restrict its examination to sources relied
on by Tadić rather than consulting other sources of custom,204 but it did not dispute that the Essen
Lynching and Borkum Island cases might ‘indeed be directly relevant to JCE III’.205 Rather, the
ECCC declined to rely on them ‘in the absence of a reasoned judgment’.206 Yet other cases, not
relied upon by Tadić or considered by the ECCC, support the conclusion that JCE III was a
recognized mode of liability in the post-WWII era.
For example, in The Queen v. Ikeda, the Batavia Military Tribunal prosecuted a Japanese
army colonel for war crimes for his role in the provision of Dutch ‘comfort women’ to Japanese

Deputy Judge Advocate’s Office Review and Recommendation, supra n. 199, at 6-7 (describing statements by the
mayor to ‘beat them dead’ and by other civilians to ‘kill them dead’).
200

201

Ibid. at 13-16.

202

Ibid. at 13.

203

Đorđević Appeals Chamber Judgement, ¶ 89.

Ibid. ¶ 52. At the time of the Đorđević Appeals Chamber Judgment, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of
Cambodia had not yet issued the Supreme Court’s decision in Nuon. That case did consider several additional cases
not cited by Tadić, and found them ambiguous. Co-Prosecutors v. Nuon et al., Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/SC,
Appeal Judgement, ¶¶ 792-94, 799 n.2107, 800-04 (ECCC Supreme Court Chamber, Nov. 23, 2016) (examining the
Renoth, Pohl, Ikeda, Farben, Hadamar, Mauthausen, Russelsheim, Tashiro, Hatakeyama, Matsumoto, and Ishiyama
cases). Even if these cases were ambiguous – and the following analysis of the Ikeda, Hatakeyama, and Matsumoto
cases suggests that they were not – that would not prove that a mode of liability similar to JCE III was not used in any
of the thousands of cases tried in the post-WWII era.
204

205

Co-Prosecutors v. Ieng, Case No. 002/19-09-2007-ECCC/OCIJ (PTC38), Public Decision on the Appeals Against
the Co-Investigative Judges Order on Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE), ¶¶ 79 (ECCC Pre-Trial Chamber, May 20,
2010).
206

Ibid.
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troops who were raped and subjected to enforced prostitution.207 The tribunal found that Ikeda was
responsible, along with others, for planning the establishment of brothels filled with girls and
women recruited from internment camps – conduct that, of itself, amounted to a crime against
humanity.208 Although there was no evidence that Ikeda had intended the use of force, the tribunal
held that Ikeda was responsible for the additional ‘criminal offences committed in the process’
because they ‘could and should have been anticipated’, i.e., they were foreseeable, by Ikeda.209 The
Australian Military Tribunal likewise applied a mode of liability similar to JCE III. For example,
in the Hatakeyama and Matsumoto cases – which concerned the deaths of individuals who had been
tortured – the defendants admitted that they had intended to interrogate and/or torture the victims,
but the evidence was ambiguous as to whether there had been any agreement to murder the
prisoners. Nonetheless, the defendants were convicted of murder, apparently because it was a
foreseeable result of their crimes.210 The conclusion that post-WWII decisions were based on JCE
III is buttressed by the arguments of the prosecutors and Judge Advocates in these cases. In
Hatakeyama, for instance, the Judge Advocate stated before the Australian Military Tribunal that:
‘[i]f several persons combine for an unlawful purpose, or for a lawful purpose to be effected by
unlawful means . . . and one of them, in the prosecution of it, kills a man, it is murder in all who are

207

The Queen v. Ikeda, Case No. 72 A/1947, Batavia War Crimes Tribunal, Judgment, 1 (1947), https://www.legaltools.org/doc/205dfb/pdf/.
Ibid. at 7, 8. The court elaborated that ‘even suggesting to these women and girls,’ who were ‘completely and
utterly under the control of occupation authorities,’ ‘that they should provide these kinds of services to the Japanese
already implied a criminal purport, because of the submissiveness and incarceration into which they had been
placed.’ Ibid. at 9.
208

209

Ibid. at 8. These additional offences included enforced prostitution and abduction of girls and women for the
purpose of enforced prostitution. Ibid. at 11.
210

Ibid.
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present’.211
Significantly, even the ECCC’s decision appears to leave room for the argument that some
form of extended JCE existed under customary law in the post-WWII period. Although the
ECCC’s Supreme Court Chamber found ‘that criminal liability based on making a contribution to
the implementation of a common criminal purpose was . . . limited to crimes that were actually
encompassed by the common purpose’,212 its discussion of which crimes are encompassed by a
common purpose included ‘crimes that are foreseen as means to achieve a given common
purpose, even if their commission is not certain’.213 The Chamber went on to explain that ‘if
attaining the objective of the common purpose may bring about the commission of crimes, but it
is agreed to pursue this objective regardless, these crimes are encompassed by the common
purpose because, even though not directly intended, they are contemplated by it’.214 In language
similar to that used by the ad hoc tribunals when assessing foreseeability for purposes of JCE III
liability, the Chamber stressed that ‘the common purpose may encompass crimes in which the
commission is neither desired nor certain, just as it is sufficient for the commission of certain
crimes that the perpetrator acted with dolus eventualis and therefore neither desired that the crime

211

Clarke, supra n. 194, at 857 (describing the case). Nearly identical language was used by the Judge Advocate in
the Schonfeld trial before the British Military Tribunal. See Tadić Appeals Judgment, supra n. 1, at ¶ 198. Similarly,
in the Dachau Concentration Camp Trial, the Judge Advocate stated that where two or more people join together to
commit a criminal act, they are all responsible for the consequences of the execution of that act even if the
consequence was not specifically contemplated by the parties. Minister of the Republic v. Hissène Habré, Judgement,
30 May 2016, ¶¶ 1881, available at http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/98c00a/pdf/ (quoting arguments in the case).
212

ECCC SCC Appeal Judgement, supra n.106, ¶ 807.

213

Ibid. ¶ 808.

214

Ibid.
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be committed nor was certain that it would happen’.215 Finally, the Chamber explained that
‘[w]hether a crime was contemplated by the common purpose is primarily a question of fact that –
absent an express agreement – has to be assessed taking into account all relevant circumstances,
including the overall objective of the common purpose and the likelihood that it may be attained
only at the cost of the commission of crimes’.216 Thus, even under the ECCC’s formulation of the
JCE standard, a member of a JCE may be held responsible for crimes he or she did not intend and
the commission of which was not certain, provided that the crimes were foreseeable.217 This
formulation appears to extend beyond the usual limits of JCE I and II, even if it does not fully
encompass the full breadth of JCE III liability.218
Fourth, there have been a number of decisions since the ECCC Pre-Trial decision and
Đorđević’s appeal affirming the customary status of JCE III. Most significantly, the Extraordinary
African Chambers (EAC) in Senegal convicted former Chadian dictator Hissène Habré of sexual
slavery based on JCE III.219 The trial chamber painstakingly reviewed the customary basis of JCE,

Ibid. The Chamber further explained that liability is appropriate where the member of the JCE views the crime ‘as
an eventuality treated with indifference’. Ibid. ¶ 809. This language mirrors that used by the ICTY, which described
JCE III as appropriate where ‘the accused was . . . indifferent to th[e] risk’ that an additional crime was a ‘predictable
consequence of the execution of the common design’. Tadić Appeals Judgment, supra n. 1, ¶ 204.
215

216

ECCC SCC Appeal Judgement, supra n. 106, ¶ 808.

217

Ibid.
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As mentioned earlier, a similar standard is also often employed by domestic courts in criminal cases. See
Prosecutor v. Ieng Sary et al, Co-Prosecutor’s Appeal against the Judgment of the Trial Chamber in Case 002/01,
supra n. 6, ¶50 (citing provisions on ‘individual criminal responsibility for unintended but foreseeable crimes arising
out of joint criminal enterprise’ in criminal codes of the Australia, Austria, Bangladesh, Bermuda, Botswana,
Cambodia, Canada, Egypt, Ethiopia, Fiji, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, India, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Malawi,
Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Poland, the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, Seychelles, South Africa, South Korea, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Thailand, Uganda, the United Kingdom, the
United States of America, Uruguay, Western Samoa, and Zambia).
219

Habré Judgement, supra n. 211, at ¶¶ 2157-2170.
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examining the post-World War II jurisprudence, ICTY and ICTR jurisprudence and the ECCC
decision.220 In regard to JCE III, the chamber concluded that it was part of customary law as of the
time the relevant events occurred in 1982221 and that it was sufficiently foreseeable and accessible
to the accused at that time.222 In sum, we find persuasive that time and again JCE III has passed the
test of judicial scrutiny.223
We also find unpersuasive the argument that JCE III liability is tantamount to the
imposition of guilt by association or collective guilt. Unlike guilt by association, in which mere
membership in an organization is sufficient for liability, a finding that an accused is responsible
for crimes committed as part of a joint criminal enterprise requires an intent to commit a crime as
well as the participation of the accused in the execution of the JCE’s common purpose.224 Indeed,
there can be no JCE III liability without participation by the accused in either a JCE I or II,
meaning there must first be a finding that the accused intended and participated in the JCE I
common plan or JCE II system of ill-treatment. In other words, an individual charged with JCE is

220

Ibid. ¶¶ 1865-1884.

221

Ibid. ¶ 1885

222

Ibid. ¶¶ 1892,1903.

It is also worth noting that one commentator recently nuanced their critique of JCE III after the UK’s decision in R
v. Jogee case. Now, she would allow that the foreseeability requirement, when coupled with the accused’s
assumption of the risk, removes JCE III from the realm of pure strict liability. See E. van Sliedregt, ‘Joint Criminal
Confusion: Exploring the Merits and Demerits of Joint Enterprise Liability’, in B. Krebs (ed.), Accessorial Liability
After Jogee (2019), 25-27.
223

Prosecutor v. Brđanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Judgement, ¶ 424 (ICTY Appeals Chamber, Apr. 3, 2007); Stakić
Appeals Judgment, supra n. 112, ¶ 386 (appellant was convicted because he ‘had a management and oversight
function in relation to the camps’ where the crimes were committed, and not based on ‘guilt by association’); see also
Tadić Appeals Judgment, supra n. 1, ¶¶ 220, 227; Kvočka Appeals Judgement, supra n.51, ¶ 96; Prosecutor v.
Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36A-A, Judgement, ¶ 160 (ICTR Appeals Chamber, Sept. 28, 2011); Prosecutor v.
Taylor, Case No. SCSL-03-01-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 457, 459-61 (SCSL Trial Chamber, May 18, 2012).
224
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‘charged not for his membership in a joint criminal enterprise but for his part in carrying it
out’.225 As the Martic Appeals Chamber explained,
when all the elements of JCE are met in a particular case, the accused has done far more
than merely associate with criminal persons. He has the intent to commit a crime, he has
joined with others to achieve this goal, and he has made a significant contribution to the
crime’s commission. Thus, he is appropriately held liable also for those actions of other
JCE members, or individuals used by them, that further the common criminal purpose
(first category of JCE) or criminal system (second category of JCE), or that are a natural
and foreseeable consequence of the carrying out of this crime (third category of JCE).226
Further, as Antonio Cassese has observed, an accused’s participation in the original common plan
puts him in a privileged position to foresee the further crimes that could arise out of the original
JCE.227 Thus, imposition of JCE III liability in such cases ‘convey[s] the message that [the
accused] should have opposed or impeded the crime of the “primary offender.”’228
In addition to the guilt by association critique, some critics contend that JCE III could lead
to unfair convictions, in the sense that its application could lead to the unfair labelling of minor
participants as principals.229 As an initial matter, while theoretically possible, we find it

Prosecutor v. Milutinović et al., Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on Dragoljub Ojdanić’s Motion Challenging
Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal Enterprise, ¶ 26 (ICTY Appeals Chamber, May 21, 2003) .
225

226

Prosecutor v. Milan Martić, Case No. IT-95-11-A, ICTY Appeal Judgement, 8 Oct. 2008, ¶ 172.

227

Cassese et al, supra n. 74, at 169.
Ibid.. Cassese drew upon an English case to make the point:

228

[A] secondary party who foresees that the primary offender might kill with the intent sufficient for murder,
and assists and encourages the primary offender in the criminal enterprise on this basis, should be guilty of
murder. He ought to be criminally liable for harm which he foresaw and which in fact resulted from the
crime he assisted and encouraged. . . . The criminal justice system exists to control crime. A prime function
of that system must be to deal justly but effectively with those who join others in criminal enterprises.
Experience has shown that joint criminal enterprises only too readily escalate into the commission of greater
offences.
Ibid. (quoting R. v. Powell (Anthony) and English, UK House of Lords, 1 A.C. 1, § 14 (Oct. 30, 1997)).
See, e.g., J. Ohlin, ‘The Co-Perpetrator Model of Joint Criminal Enterprise’, in A. Klip and G. Sluiter (eds.),
Annotated Leading Cases of International Criminal Tribunals: The International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia 2003 – Volume 14 (2008), 739 at 742 (“All participants of joint criminal plans are subject to equal
229
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significant that despite decades of jurisprudence by the ad hoc tribunals, critics have failed to
establish that, in practice, the use of JCE III has resulted in a serious miscarriage of justice.230
Moreover, although the Tadić Appeals Chamber held that JCE – including JCE III – is a form of
‘commission’,231 this need not imply that JCE III must always be viewed as a principal rather than
accessorial form of liability.232 Indeed, domestic or hybrid courts could use JCE III to hold
accused liable for crimes that are a natural and foreseeable consequence of a common criminal
plan without necessarily characterizing it as principal liability. This would allow courts to use
JCE III when other forms of liability, like aiding and abetting or command responsibility, might
understate or not fully capture the way in which an accused’s participation in a group’s common
criminal plan was inextricably linked with and led to the foreseeable commission of sexual
violence crimes.233

criminal liability according to the doctrine created by the Tadić court, regardless of their level of participation in the
plan. Therefore, minor participants are just as guilty as architects, hangers-on just as liable as organizers.”).
230

See Defence counsel Hague Discussions, supra n. 142 (noting that three defence counsel who represented different
accused before international tribunals confirmed that they could not recall a single case in which an accused had been
convicted on the basis of JCE III that they felt amounted to a serious miscarriage of justice). This may well be
because, as mentioned earlier, no conviction for JCE III can stand without participation by the accused in a JCE I or
II, meaning anyone convicted of crimes on the basis of JCE III also participated in a JCE I or II atrocity crime
typically involving grave abuses against mass numbers of victims.
231

See supra n. 29and accompanying test.

232

As we have discussed, the Rome Statute has two group liability provisions, joint commission under Article
25(3)(a) and common purpose liability under Article 25(3)(d). The idea here is that domestic or hybrid courts could
apply something similar to Article 25(3)(d) but with the JCE III foreseeability mens rea rather than the “aim of
furthering” or virtual certainty standard required under Article 25(3)(d). See infra n. 261 and accompanying text.
While this parts from the recognition by Tadic of JCE III as a principal form of liability under customary
international law, it would not run afoul of the nullum crimen sine lege principle, as the only change – characterizing
it as accessorial rather than principal – actually favors the accused. See Claus Kreβ, Nulla poena nullum crimen sine
lege, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW (2010), https://www.legaltools.org/doc/f9b453/pdf/ . “The [nullum crimen sine lege] principle of non-retroactivity does not apply to rules that
are favourable to the accused.”).
Assisting another person to commit a crime (aiding and abetting) and failing to prevent one’s subordinates from
committing crimes (command responsibility) is different than contributing to a group’s common criminal plan
233
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Significantly, JCE III is critical to capturing how SGBV crimes often unfold during times
of mass violence. Sometimes rape is ordered by military or political leaders, but often it is not
explicitly planned or orchestrated from the outset. Sexual violence may initially be committed
because the atmosphere of war and the violence, lawlessness, and chaos it produces permits it to
occur. However, once it becomes clear that superiors do not disapprove of sexual violence, the
‘opportunistic rapes typically then become more public, more frequent, and more violent, growing
indistinguishable from and becoming part of the organized rapes committed at least in part to
inflict widespread terror and/or harm on the targeted group’.234 Thus, while sexual violence may
at first appear unintended, it is often connected to the commission of other intended crimes. JCE
III captures the reality of the way in which this violence unfolds.235
In sum, in addition to agreeing with the decisions affirming the customary status of JCE
III, we believe JCE III’s ability to capture the unique contextual circumstances under which
sexual violence is often perpetrated in times of conflict or mass violence provides yet another
compelling reason to push back against the critique of JCE III. The importance of the JCE III
contextual analysis of SGBV crimes is illustrated in the final trial judgment in Prosecutor v.
Karadžić.236 In convicting Karadžić for a myriad of JCE III crimes, the Trial Chamber held that it:

knowing other crimes will probably be committed. As discussed in infra Section I, there is a participation and group
aspect to the latter that is not necessarily captured by complicity or command responsibility.
K. Askin, ‘Prosecuting Gender Crimes Committed in Darfur: Holding Leaders Accountable for Sexual Violence’,
in S. Totten & E. Markusen (eds.), Genocide inn Darfur: Investigating the Atrocities in the Sudan 142 (2009).
234

As the last Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY observed, ‘[w]hile rape has historically been considered an opportunistic
war crime, we have successfully proved that it is a foreseeable consequence of criminal plans to forcibly expel
civilian populations.’ ICTY Commemoration: Reflection on 24 Years of Fighting Impunity through International
Courts and Tribunals, Statement by S. Brammertz, (New York, 4 Dec. 2017),
http://www.icty.org/x/file/Press/Statements%20and%20Speeches/Prosecutor/170512-remarks-by-the-prosecutor.pdf.
235

236

Prosecutor v. Karadžić, Case No. IT-95-5/18-T, Trial Chamber Judgement, 24 March 2016.
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is convinced beyond reasonable doubt that it was foreseeable to the Accused that
persecution through torture, beatings, physical and psychological abuse, rape and other
acts of sexual violence, and the establishment and perpetuation of inhumane living
conditions in detention facilities as cruel or inhumane treatment, killings, [and] forced
labour at the frontline… might be committed by Serb Forces used to carry out the
objective of the common plan, during the execution of the common plan, with
discriminatory intent.237
Thus, we suggest that courts heed customary international law and its attendant liability forms,
including JCE III, when assessing liability for SGBV crimes under international criminal law.
B.

Article 25(3) of the Rome Statute

Our second recommendation relates to the ICC’s interpretation of Article 25(3) of the Rome
Statute, in particular the provisions relating to co-perpetration, indirect perpetration, and common
purpose liability. As discussed above – and as both scholars and dissenting judges at the ICC have
pointed out – the Court’s restrictive interpretation of Article 25(3)(a) is neither well-grounded in
the Statute nor mandated by customary international law. Moreover, by limiting Article 25(3)(a) to
those with control over the crime and, requiring the Court to rely on Article 25(3)(d) in cases of
group liability where the facts do not support such a limited interpretation while at the same time
applying Article 25(3)(d) differently to crimes of sexual violence than other crimes, the Court has
adopted an approach with negative consequences for the prosecution of SGVB crimes. Indeed,
although Article 25(3) appears facially neutral in its application to crimes within the jurisdiction of
the ICC, the Court’s interpretation of these modes of liability, with the recent exception of
Ntaganda, has adversely impacted the prosecution of SGVB crimes. If the ICC is to fulfil its

237

Ibid. ¶ 3521. Significantly, in its near-final appellate jurisprudence emanating from the armed conflict in the
former Yugoslavia, the Appeals Chamber of the Mechanism for International Criminal Tribunals (successor to the
ICTY) reaffirmed the mens rea and the customary basis of the JCE III doctrine. See Prosecutor v. Karadžić,
Judgment, Case No. MICT-13-55-A, 20 March 2019, ¶ 433.
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mandate, it must recognize and address these issues. We identify here two ways the Court might do
this:
1. Adopt a plain reading interpretation of Article 25(3)(a)
One possibility is for the Court to revisit its interpretation of commission under Article
25(3)(a). Rather than interpreting Article 25(3) as requiring a distinction between principals and
accessories or importing the control over the crime theory to give effect to this distinction, the
Court could adopt a plain reading of the provision, as dissenting judges Fulford and Van den
Wyngaert have suggested.238 There is nothing in the text of Article 25(3) itself that warrants the
imposition of the hyper complexity that the Court’s early case law has developed, in which the
term ‘indirect co-perpetrator’ is used to describe the responsibility of top-level accused (like
Muammar Gaddafi) for crimes committed by their own forces,239 and the inclusion of a ‘common
plan’ is required for ‘committed jointly’ under Article 25(3)(a), even though ‘common plan’ is
absent Article from 25(3)(a) and explicitly referenced in Article 25(3)(d). Under standard canons
of treaty interpretation, as well as Article 21 of the Rome Statute, looking to plain language
should be the starting point of the Court’s analysis,240 as opposed to references to abstract legal
theories such as Roxin’s control of the crime theory. This might lead not only to ‘a simpler, more
internationally acceptable and predictable understanding of modes of liability at the ICC’241 as

238

Sadat & Jolly, supra n.2.

239

Situation in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Warrant of Arrest for Muammar Mohammed Abu Minyar Gaddafi, ICC01/11-13, P.T.Ch. I, 27 June 2011, 6.
240

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 8 I.L.M. 679, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980,
arts. 31 & 32.
241

Sadat & Jolly, supra n. 2, at 785.
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one of us has argued, but also to greater accountability for SGBV crimes. To the extent, for
instance, joint commission is interpreted to require some kind of coordinated action242 (rather than
a ‘common plan’243) and a direct244 (rather than an ‘essential’245) contribution, it would likely be
more possible to hold perpetrators accountable for the way in which collective sexual violence
often unfolds in situations of conflict – again, not necessarily orchestrated, yet nevertheless
interconnected with the commission of other intended crimes.246
This approach is consistent with that of the ad hoc tribunals, which have recognized that
perpetrators can be held responsible for sexual violence crimes not only when those crimes clearly
form a component of a common plan from the outset, but also when they become part of the
group’s action over time. In the Krajišnik case, for instance, while sexual violence was not part of
the group’s original plan to forcibly remove Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from areas of
Bosnia, the Trial Chamber found the accused could nevertheless be held liable for the sexual
violence, after the prosecution showed that the accused had been informed of the violence, did

242

See Lubanga Trial Judgment (Fulford Opinion, supra n.137, at ¶ 16; Ngudjolo Trial Judgment (Van den Wyngaert
Opinion, supra n. 138, ¶ 32.
243

Lubanga Trial Judgement, supra n. 130, ¶ 981.

244

See Lubanga Trial Judgment (Fulford Opinion, supra n. 137, at ¶ 16; Ngudjolo Trial Judgement (Van den
Wyngaert Opinion, supra n.138, ¶ 44.
245

Lubanga Trial Judgement, supra n.130, ¶ 999.

246

While, as we argue in Section IV.B.2. below, a gender competent approach to Article 25(3)(d) might lead to
greater accountability for SGBV crimes, we see no reason for the Court to maintain its restrictive approach to Article
25(3)(a), which is not only unsupported by a plain reading of the provision but would unnecessarily limit grouprelated SGBV crimes to Article 25(3)(d). Reading Article 25(3)(a) in the way we suggest would allow a range of
possible forms of liability for SGBV crimes, and permit the Court to use both Articles 25(3)(a) and (d), depending on
the facts and circumstances of the case.
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nothing to prevent its recurrence, and persisted in pursuing the group’s plan.247 As the ICTY
explained:
Whether other crimes were “original” to the common objective or were added later is of
course a matter of evidence, not logical analysis. The Chamber’s preference is for a
strictly empirical approach which does not speculate about the crime profile of the original
JCE objective, but conceptualizes the common objective as fluid in its criminal means.248
While the facts in Krajišnik would likely not have met the strict ‘common plan’ and ‘essential’
contribution standards required by the control over the crime theory, they would likely be sufficient
to hold perpetrators responsible for the sexual violence if the Court adopted a plain reading of
Article 25(3)(a).
We underscore that Article 25(3)(a)’s restrictive outcomes depend upon the judicial
interpretation of factual evidence admitted by the chamber about the common plan. A tilt toward a
broader application of the facts to Article 25(3)(a) is tenable, as demonstrated in Ntaganda. There,
the Trial Chamber deliberated upon the common plan of the UPC/FPLC, which was to occupy key
positions in Ituri through a military operation that involved conducting an attack on Lendu
civilians.249 To understand the common plan, the Chamber examined the overall objective of the

247

Prosecutor v. Krajišnik, Case No IT‑00‑39‑T, Trial Chamber Judgement, 27 September 2006, ¶¶ 1105, 1117-19.
Though the Appeals Chamber overturned the conviction for crimes forming part of the expanded plan, this was due to
lack of evidence regarding when the common purpose was expanded to include those other crimes and not because of
an objection to the notion that an accused can be held liable for an expanded common purpose. See also Prosecutor v.
Radoslav Brđanin, Case No. IT-, Appeals Chamber Judgement, ¶ 365 (holding that the principal perpetrator does not
have to be a member of the JCE as long as there was a common purpose to undertake the crime and one member of
the JCE is linked to the perpetrator).
248

Prosecutor v Krajisnik , Case No. IT-00-39-T, Trial Judgement, 27 September 2006, ¶ 1098. The Appeals
Chamber confirmed that the means of achieving a common purpose can evolve over time if the JCE members agreed
on this expansion of means. Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Case No IT‑00‑39‑A, Appeals Chamber Judgement, 17 March
2009, ¶ 163.
249

Ntaganda Trial Judgment, supra n. 14, ¶ 801.

57

DRAFT
Final version published by CUP 11/27/19
https://doi.org/10.1017/S092215651900061X

attacks, including the content of military instructions and direct orders.250 Likewise, evidence of
discussions to plan the operations, months prior to the deployment, and, most notably, a side
conversation about infliction of rapes to instil fear on the enemy were contemplated.251
Accordingly, the Ntaganda Chamber viewed the attack to destroy, disintegrate and drive out the
Lendu community as an agreement that “inherently involved the targeting of civilians individuals
by way of acts of killing and raping as well as … acts of appropriation and destruction” of
property.252 SGBV crimes were integral253 to execution of the agreement:
Regarding acts of sexual violence, the Chamber notes that the unfolding of these acts were
like the acts of killings and other acts of physical violence, a tool used by the UPC/FPLC
soldiers and commanders alike to achieve their objectives to destroy the Lendu community
The Chamber notes the words pronounced by a UPC/FPLC soldier during a rape and at a
moment when many of the victims were raped: he compared the Lendu to non-human
elements to be exterminated. It is significant that the UPC/FPLC soldiers killed or attempted
to kill many of the civilians they subjected to sexual violence. A survivor compared her
experience to dying.254
Further, although the Chamber found certain acts of sexual violence not within the coperpetrators’ express understanding of the common plan, it nonetheless found their commission a
virtual certainty, given the circumstances prevailing at the time, and therefore part of the plan.255
As the Chamber stated,

250

Ibid. ¶ ¶ 802 and 803. The judgment states that Mr. Ntaganda and Salumu Mulenda issued specific and repeated
orders to attack the Lendu.
251
252

Ibid. ¶¶ 293, 799.
Ibid. ¶ 809.

253

The Chambers concluded that by virtue of the agreement to drive the Lendu out of the area, the accused meant
beyond reasonable doubt “for civilians be raped and subjected to sexual slavery”. Ibid. ¶ 810.
254

Ibid, ¶ 805 (emphasis added).

Ibid, ¶ 775 (“It is not required that the common plan between individuals was specifically directed at the
commission of a crime; it suffices that the common plan contained a critical element of criminality, and that it was
virtually certain that the implementation of the common plan would lead to the commission of the crimes at issue.”).
255
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the co-perpetrators were virtually certain that the implementation of their plan to drive out
all the Lendu from the localities targeted during the course of their military campaign…
would lead to: (i) the recruitment and active use in hostilities of children under the age of
15 within the UPC/FPLC (Counts 14, 15 and 16); and (ii) the rape and sexual slavery of
these children (Counts 6 and 9). Indeed, the Chamber finds that, in the circumstances
prevailing in Ituri at the time, the occurrence of these crimes was not simply a risk that they
accepted, but crimes they foresaw with virtual certainty.256
Thus, Ntaganda emphasized the contextualization of all the criminal acts, highlighting the
connection between the crimes rather than characterizing the sexual violence as unexpected and
unrelated to the other crimes.
Notwithstanding the Chamber’s broad approach to the common plan, Ntaganda’s liability
as an indirect co-perpetrator required the Chamber to assess the accused’s control over the crime
through his essential contribution to it and resulting ability to frustrate its commission.257 While it
found such control to be present in this case,258 cases in which sexual violence unfolds as part of
the plan but evidence of the accused’s control over the crime is less compelling would still likely
fail. Moreover, whether Ntaganda represents a one-time exception or a partial attempt to correct
the Court’s previous failures to recognize and understand how sexual violence evolves in the
context of collective criminal conduct remains to be seen.
2. Use gender informed analysis when applying Article 25(3)(d) to SGBV crimes by
examining the overall context in which the sexual violence occurred and the role such
violence played in the group’s common plan.
The Court appears to be treating SGVB crimes differently than others under Article
25(3)(d), with adverse consequences to their successful prosecution. Yet as the Appeals Chamber
underscored in Đorđević, sexual violence crimes ‘must not be treated differently from other violent

256
257

Ibid, ¶ 811.
Ibid., ¶¶ 774, 779, 826.

258

Ibid., ¶ 857.
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acts simply because of their sexual component’.259 Taking a contextual approach to analysing
whether the acts charged formed part of the common plan would help the court avoid isolating and
treating SGBV crimes differently from other crimes. As the Stakić case discussed above260 suggests,
examining the overall context in which the sexual violence occurred, and the role such violence
played in achieving the objectives of the group would allow the Court to properly understand
whether sexual violence crimes were part of the common plan, rather than opportunistic or unrelated
crimes. Had the Chamber in Katanga case taken a similar approach, the result might have been
different.
Significantly, taking into account context might also help the Court more accurately assess
whether an accused’s contribution was made in the knowledge of the intent of the group to
commit the crime, an element also required under Article 25(3)(d). According to Katanga, this
knowledge requirement can be shown either by proving ‘the group meant to cause the
consequences which constituted the crime’ or was ‘aware that the crime would occur in the
ordinary course of events.’261 Although the latter phrase – as interpreted by the Lubanga Appeals
Chamber - requires ‘virtual certainty’ that the crime will occur262 (presumably a higher standard
than the foreseeability standard in JCE III cases), the factors used by the ad hoc tribunals to assess
whether SGBV crimes were connected with other crimes, and therefore foreseeable or even

259

Đorđević Appeals Chamber Judgement, supra n. 62, ¶ 917.

260

See supra n. 175-176 and accompanying text.

261

Katanga Trial Chamber Judgement, supra n. 134, at ¶1627.

262

Prosecutor v. Lubanga, No. ICC-01/04-01/06 A 5, Appeal Chamber Judgement, 1 December 2014, ¶ 447.

60

DRAFT
Final version published by CUP 11/27/19
https://doi.org/10.1017/S092215651900061X

intended, may be equally helpful in meeting this standard.263 Indeed, while scale and prior
commission of SGBV crimes may help show the accused was aware that sexual violence would
occur in the ordinary course of events, other factors such as the overall context in which the
violence occurred and the objectives of the group may be equally relevant and sufficient to show
the requisite knowledge. For instance, in the Kvočka case, the ICTY found rape in detention was
foreseeable – despite the absence of evidence showing that the accused knew that women had
been previously raped in that camp – by drawing common sense inferences from the surrounding
circumstances.264 The Trial Chamber first noted that ‘[a]pproximately 36 women were held in
detention, guarded by men with weapons who were often drunk, violent and physically and
mentally abusive and who were allowed to act with virtual impunity.” It then concluded that:
it would be unrealistic and contrary to all rational logic to expect that none of the women
held in Omarska, placed in circumstances rendering them especially vulnerable, would be
subjected to rape or other forms of sexual violence. This is particularly true in light of the
clear intent of the criminal enterprise to subject the target group to persecution through
such means as violence and humiliation.265
This approach could be equally helpful in meeting the knowledge requirement in Article 25(3)(d).

263

This is because despite differences at the far end of each standard, potentially, there is overlap in the factual
situations that are both foreseeable and virtually certain. Moreover, although a full examination of the mens rea
standard adopted in Article 30 of the Rome Statute is beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that the ICC
has not always interpreted the phrase ‘aware that the crime would occur in the ordinary course of events’ as requiring
a ‘virtual certainty’ that it will occur. While this was the standard employed by the Lubanga Appeal Chamber, see
supra n. 262, as well as the Katanga Trial Chamber, Katanga Trial Chamber Judgement, see supra n. 134, at ¶1 776
(citing Prosecutor v. Bemba, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08-424, Pre-Trial Chamber II, Decision Pursuant to Article
61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute on the Charges of the Prosecutor Against Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, 15 June
2009, ¶¶ 352-369), an earlier interpretation of this phrase by the Lubanga Pre-Trial Chamber included the concepts of
dolus eventualis. See Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-803, Decision on the
confirmation of charges, 29 January 2009, ¶¶ 351-2. Given the experience of the ad hoc tribunals discussed in
Section II, the ‘virtual certainty’ standard may be difficult to prove in SGBV cases, suggesting that the Appeals
Chamber may want to revisit this standard and consider adopting the approach taken by the Lubanga Pre-Trial
Chamber.
264

Kvočka Trial Judgement, supra n. 62, ¶ 327.
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Ibid.
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Interestingly, the Trial Chamber’s analysis in Ntaganda, although examined under Article
25(3)(a), could be instructive. As discussed earlier, although the Chamber found that the rape and
sexual slavery of child soldiers was not within the co-perpetrators’ express understanding of the
common plan, it nonetheless found the commission of these crimes a “virtual certainty”, given the
circumstances prevailing at the time, and therefore part of the plan.266 Indeed, as with Kvočka, the
Chamber found the overall context in which the violence occurred and the objectives of the group
relevant and sufficient to show that the perpetrators were virtually certain that those crimes would
be committed. Clearly, if this was adequate to meet the common plan standard under Article
25(3)(a), it would also suffice to meet the knowledge standard under Article 25(3)(d).

V.

Conclusion
We conclude by offering a few thoughts about the benefits of adopting these approaches to

international criminal law more broadly. Using a contextual approach to assessing foreseeability
under JCE III and common purpose liability under the Rome Statute may help international criminal
courts and tribunals more accurately apply other modes of liability where foreseeability or
constructive knowledge is a required element, such as command responsibility, which makes liable
commanders who knew or should have known that crimes were – or were about to be – committed
by his or her subordinates. In our view, it could have informed the Appeals Chamber in the Bemba
case, which found that Bemba – who had organized, paid and led a mercenary army – could not be
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Ntaganda Trial Judgment, supra n. 14, ¶¶ 811.
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found liable for the SGBV crimes committed by his troops because, among other things, he was a
‘remote’ commander.267
More generally, acknowledging how sexual violence actually unfolds during times of mass
violence and using a contextual approach to assessing common purpose liability or co-perpetration
might also help make more visible conduct that is often overlooked in the context of conflict or
mass violence, such as sexual violence against males. Although sexual violence against males has
been infrequently investigated and prosecuted, it too has played a role in atrocity crimes, especially
detention-related violence.268
Adopting this approach might also help more accurately explain the motivation of
perpetrators, a part of the narrative not often explored by the tribunals. As others have noted, not
all perpetrators are deviants. It is sometimes a shockingly ordinary person that participates in
atrocity crimes.269 Taking the time to understand and recognize the context in which violence occurs
might help demonstrate more clearly what motivated the perpetrators to act. Understanding these
dynamics more clearly will not only help tribunals more accurately characterize the liability of the

Bemba Appeals Chamber Judgement, supra n. 11. For a critique of the judgement, see SáCouto & Sellers, ‘The
Bemba Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra n. 12; L. Sadat, Fiddling While Rome Burns: The Appeals Chamber’s
Curious Decision in Prosecutor v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, EJIL Talk!, June 12, 2018, available at
https://www.ejiltalk.org/fiddling-while-rome-burns-the-appeals-chambers-curious-decision-in-prosecutor-v-jeanpierre-bemba-gombo/ ; D. Amann, In Bemba and Beyond, Crimes Adjudged to Commit Themselves, EJIL Talk!, June
13, 2018, available at https://www.ejiltalk.org/in-bemba-and-beyond-crimes-adjudged-to-commit-themselves/; S.
SáCouto, The Impact of the Appeals Decision in Bemba: Impunity for Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes,
International Justice Monitor, June 22, 2018, available at www.ijmonitor.org/2018/06/the-impact-of-the-appealschamber-decision-in-bemba-impunity-for-sexual-and-gender-based-crimes/.
267

See P. Sellers and L. Nwoye, ‘Conflict-Related Male Sexual Violence and the International Jurisprudence’, in M.
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accused but may also help the international community develop more effective prevention
strategies.
Finally, it is worth observing that the International Criminal Court is the institution charged
with the mandate to carry international criminal law forward at the international level. The ICC is
embedded more generally in the international legal system, a legal system in which power
imbalances between genders, between rich and poor, between strong and weak play out just as they
do in national legal systems. Yet we can and should expect better of the Court – an institution
charged with the administration of justice not only for the strong, but especially for the weak. A
high level of impunity for SGBV crimes persists at the ICC, even though the situations giving rise
to acquittals for SGBV crimes are universally acknowledged to be situations in which rape, sexual
slavery and other SGBV crimes are and have been endemic. While much criticism has been directed
at the Office of the Prosecutor regarding those acquittals,270 following the decisions in the Katanga
and Bemba cases, it is now clear that the Court’s highly restrictive jurisprudence on modes of
liability presents a major obstacle to the successful prosecution of these cases,271 at least as regards
individuals of high rank who did not themselves perpetrate the crimes. This, of course, undermines
the very purpose for which the ICC was established, following the Nuremberg and Tokyo
precedents. While the Trial Chamber’s judgment in Ntaganda may represent a partial attempt to
right the near-categorical impunity for SGBV crimes seen thus far at the ICC, it is not yet clear if
the case will be appealed or what impact it will have on other cases now at trial, such as the Ongwen
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and Al Hassan cases.272 Absent a decisive shift toward – and beyond – the Ntaganda approach, the
Court’s otherwise restrictive jurisprudence presents a cautionary tale about how the elaboration of
well-meaning intellectual constructs can deprive legal text of practical force and effect; and how –
in spite of the advances made – international criminal law remains, like international law itself, a
‘thoroughly gendered system’.273
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